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ABSTRACT 
In a world of increasing environmental awareness and activism, is it 
economically advantageous for a forestry resource firm to be proactive in the 
integration of community stakeholders’ desires into the business operations?  To 
what degree, and in what form, does the firm include the local community as a 
stakeholder?  What are the economic consequences to the firm from taking 
various stances in relationship to the community and the resulting allocation of 
forest resources to the firm?  The objective of this research is to test the 
hypothesis that large industrial resource companies should decentralize more of 
the production process to the communities which they draw the resource from as 
a means of sustaining their profitability within a changing sociopolitical climate 
of community resource ownership.   
The Province of Saskatchewan and more specifically northwest Saskatchewan 
including the towns of Meadow Lake, Beauval, Green Lake, and north are the 
geographic focus of this study.  This research examines the economic feasibility 
of decentralizing the Oriented Strand Board (OSB) feedstock manufacturing 
process to the remote communities where the primary resource is extracted.  A 
game-theoretic approach is used to assess the long-run gain or cost of co-
operating with the community and installing a remote stranding facility instead 
of hauling the unprocessed fiber to a centrally located Oriented Strand Board 
(OSB) plant. 
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There are no technical reasons for lack of implementation of remote stranding 
facilities in North America.  Current practices relate to the economics of 
centralization and to the ownership/control of the resource.  This research shows 
that the major forestry firm’s long-term profitability could improve, or diminish 
less, with a remote stranding plant due to a stabilized wood-supply to the OSB 
plant. The installation of the remote strander reduces the community’s incentive 
to seeking alternative allocation, through judicial and/or legal means, for the 
wood fiber that it deems to be its property. 
Based on this research, the forestry resource firm needs to examine the ability 
of the community to process the regional wood fiber instead of the firm.  The 
community development corporation can empower itself through the acquisition 
of the technical expertise and financial backing to process some of the wood fiber 
from the region.  This would increase their bargaining credibility as a viable 
threat to the firm, and thus induce co-operation from the resource firm in 
pursuing community economic development.  If they have the capabilities to 
follow through on alternative processing, the forestry firm should view the 
community as having a high salience to their long-term profitability. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The current rate of global forest industrialization is unprecedented in history 
(Marchak, 1995; May, 1998).  Because of this forest industrialization, the forestry-
based communities are undergoing tremendous pressures to redefine where and 
how they are contributing to society.  Many forestry communities have doubts 
about the current model of development (Hettne, 1990), realizing that the 
benefits accruing to the community from the fiber usage by the forestry firm are 
often more than offset by the decline in total forest value (Hawken et al, 1999).  
For the community to continue supporting harvest of the forests, it needs to 
receive a fair return on what it considers its property.  Without this, the 
community may attempt to redefine local property rights over the forestry 
resource deeded by provincial legislative action to the external forestry 
corporation (Alcorn and Toledo, 1998).  
The resource extraction industries of forestry, mining, fishing, oil and gas are 
at the core of the Canadian economy.  These industries have been scrutinized for 
their lack of sustainable management of the ecosystem and lack of contribution 
to the resource-based community (Copeland, 1999; Marchak, 1995).  How do 
they interact and co-operate with these communities, enabling the firm to 
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continue to profit from the resource and, at the same time, providing the 
economic and social returns that the communities require (Urquhart, 2001)? 
This research examined the relationship between a multi-community 
northern development corporation and a forestry firm, and is modeled after 
North West Communities Wood Products Ltd. (NWC), and Tolko Forest 
Industries Ltd. (Tolko).  The latter organization is a privately held Canadian 
forestry products company headquartered in Vernon, British Columbia.  This 
research focuses on the situation of Tolko Forest Industries Ltd. and North West 
Community Wood Products Ltd. for illustrative purposes and concreteness.  The 
data used to derive the financial assumptions of the parties is based on the 
author’s previous work as a community development consultant, and were not 
provided by Tolko.  The result is that the financial assumptions and the resulting 
player’s payoffs are specific to their geographic location, but are generic to the 
industry, not one particular firm’s operations.  The research is a synthetic 
exercise that does not to precisely mirror the financial operations of these firms. 
NWC has proposed to Tolko that a remote stranding facility be placed in one 
of the member communities to process wood fiber from the region and waste 
from NWC’s aspen and spruce sawmill.  In this thesis, a game-theoretic approach 
is used to assess the long-run gain or cost to Tolko for co-operating with NWC 
and installing the remote stranding facility instead of hauling the fiber to the 
Oriented Strand Board (OSB) plant in Meadow Lake, Saskatchewan. 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
In a world of increasing environmental awareness and activism, is it 
economically advantageous for the forestry resource firm to be proactive in the 
integration of community stakeholders’ desires in the business operations?  To 
what degree, and in what form, does the firm include the local community as a 
stakeholder?  What are the economic consequences to the firm from taking 
various stances in relationship to the community and the resulting allocation of 
resources to the firm?  
It was Friedman’s (1970) assertion that a firm’s responsibility is solely to the 
shareholder in terms of maximizing profits. Social concern, beyond the 
regulatory minimum, detracts from the profit of the firm and hence is not being 
responsible to the shareholder.  For industries or businesses, maximizing the 
short-term economic gains is the action of choice.  The perceived benefits of 
collaboration relative to the costs of relinquishing power and/or control by 
management are not deemed worthwhile.  Hart (1996); Sharma and Vredenburg 
(1998); and Russo and Fouts (1997) find that there is an advantage to the firm in 
pursuing proactive strategies towards the environment and stakeholders. In 
Perlmutter and Trist’s (1986) vernacular, the firm needs to effect an 
organizational paradigm shift from an Industrial Paradigm (Paradigm I) to 
Symbiotic Paradigm (Paradigm S). 
With forestry resource communities seeking increased property rights to the 
wood fiber itself, and the resulting economic benefits derived from the 
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surrounding forests, the firm has to decide how to arrive at an advantageous 
solution for itself.  Forestry firms need to assess potential payoffs for co-
operating or not co-operating with the community(ies) in their economic 
development aspirations when faced with the potential of losing 10%, 20% or 
more of their annual resource allocation from a region through community 
action. 
1.3 Objective 
This research examined the decentralizing of the Oriented Strand Board 
(OSB) feedstock manufacturing process to the remote community where the 
resource is being extracted. The objective of this research is to test the hypothesis 
that large industrial resource companies should decentralize more of the 
production process to the communities from which they draw the resource as a 
means of sustaining their profitability within a changing sociopolitical climate of 
community resource ownership.  The property-rights game-theoretic model was 
applied to the concrete example of NWC and Tolko and the possible installation 
of a remote stranding facility by the parties. 
1.4 Hypothesis 
Based on the above objective, the hypothesis was delineated that tests the 
economic profitability to the firm of developing community-based remote 
processing. 
Hypothesis: By Meadow Lake Partnership OSB Ltd. vertically de-integrating, i.e. 
outsourcing its processing services, there will be a long-term improvement in 
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their Meadow Lake OSB plant’s profitability due to a secure and increased 
feedstock for the plant, as measured by NPV over a 10 year planning horizon; 
It is believed that major resource firm’s long-term profitability will improve 
due to co-operating with the community in the development of its local 
economy.  The installation of the remote strander reduces the community 
incentive for seeking alternative allocation for the wood fiber that it deems to be 
its property through judicial and/or legal means. 
 1.5 Scope of the Study 
The Province of Saskatchewan, and more specifically, northwest 
Saskatchewan including the towns of Meadow Lake, Beauval, and Canoe 
Narrows are the geographic focus of this study.  The study examines the 
interaction and investments of North West Communities Wood Products Ltd. 
(NWC), representing a multi-community development organization, and Tolko 
Industries Ltd., representing a forest industry firm.   
Tolko is building an OSB plant near Meadow Lake, Saskatchewan.  The case 
study examines the decentralizing of the first stage of the processing in the 
production of Oriented Strand Board.  The technical feasibility of remote 
stranding was examined first to ensure that this is not a limitation to the 
adaptation of remote stranding for supplying feedstock to the OSB plant.  An 
economic analysis followed, using a “Game-Theoretic Prisoner’s Dilemma” 
framework to assess the long-term (10 year) economic payoffs to Tolko and 
NWC by building a remote strander operation in Beauval, SK as compared with 
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the potential for timber loss through fiber withholding by NWC if the plant is not 
built.  The firm assesses when it would be beneficial to their profitability to build 
the remote processing facilities based on the community’s perceived ability to 
change the economic property-rights ownership level from the present 
conditions of 100% firm control. 
1.6 Outline of Study 
Chapter Two contains a review of stakeholder-firm co-operation, and the 
issue of economic property-rights.  Chapter Three explores game-theory’s 
application to strategic decision-making and develops the conceptual framework 
with the use of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  Chapter Four delineates the 
players in the game and the historical context of forestry firm and community 
collaboration in northwest Saskatchewan.  Chapter Five applies the model to 
NWC and the Tolko OSB plant, located in Meadow Lake, SK.  Chapter Six tests 
whether it is in the long-term interest of the firm to co-operate with the 
community and decentralize some of its operations, and under what conditions 
the community and the firm should co-operate and reports the results.  Finally, 
Chapter Seven summarizes the results of the research, discusses the implications 
and suggests further areas of research.
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Chapter 2 
Stakeholder Theory and Resource Property Rights 
2.1 Introduction 
The nature of a forestry-based community and where it fits into the modern 
forest resource economy has become one of the major political and social issues 
of rural Canada.  How do we bring sustainability to the forestry community?  As 
Beckley states: 
Human dependence upon the forests, whether at the individual, 
household, community, or regional level, is a multifaceted phenomenon.  
This is due to the fact, that forests provide a diverse stream of benefits to 
humans.  Forests, or their component parts, provide timber and non-
timber commodities, recreational experiences, and sustenance to active 
forest users.  Passive forest users of forest-individuals who attach cultural 
value to forests-also derive both economic and non-economic benefit from 
the existence of forests (Beckley, 1998b). 
There are changing relationships between the institutions of government, the 
community, and the forestry firm.  These relationships are changing based on: 
• Governments increasingly having the firm manage the resource 
(Natural Resource Canada, 1999); 
• The rise in co-management of the resource by the stakeholders 
(Beckley and Korber, 1996);  
• The increased environmental awareness on the part of society and 
the effect of humanity on the forest (Canadian Council of Forest 
Ministers, 2000); 
• The recognition of the aboriginal/northern community’s rights to 
manage the forestry resource through co-management (Anderson, 
1995);  
• Communities redefining their goals for development so that they 
can be sustainable (Copeland, 1999).  
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The industrial forestry sector looks toward new technology, least cost 
production, and centralized decision making as the key to the forest sector’s 
sustainability.  This productivist paradigm is counter to community’s needs, 
profits are exported away from their source, the forest ecosystems are left 
exhausted, the forest value is seen only as a sum of the trees, and eventually the 
community is left with no natural or social capital or forest equity (Malenfant, 
1997). 
2.2 Firm/Stakeholder Co-operation 
Perlmutter and Trist (1986) view the players of the world economy as 
operating in one of three paradigms; Paradigm I (Industrial), Paradigm D 
(Deindustrial) or Paradigm S (Symbiotic).  The societal actions/reactions, as they 
defined them under the Industrial Paradigm and the Symbiotic Paradigm, are 
compared and contrasted below (Table 2-1). Under the Industrial Paradigm, 
society is driven down a path of increasing technology, short-term 
environmental planning, a me-first competitive stance, and the centralization of 
benefits.  This is non-sustainable from a long-term environmental, economic, and 
social perspective (Norgaard, 1992). 
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Social 
Institutions 
Paradigm I(ndustrial) Paradigm S(ymbiotic) 
Economy Worldwide free market premised 
on continuous (blind) growth  
World, regional, national and local 
markets, free and regulated; 
integration of formal and informal 
economies; selective managed 
growth 
Corporation Dominance of large-scale, high-
technology firms, bureaucratically 
organized whether ownership 
private or public.  Trans-Nationals 
encouraged  
All types and scales as appropriate; 
small-in-large, organizational 
democracy 
Individual Individualism win-lose, he 
oriented, having oriented, 
privatized 
Balance of co-operation and 
competition, “individuation”, 
socially responsible individuality, 
being-having orientation 
Technological 
Choice 
Technological imperative, high 
technology preferred, 
nonrenewable resources favored, 
environment neglected 
Limits of systems including the 
ecological and the use of 
increased/higher technology to 
bring increased well-being becomes 
a guiding principle 
Table 2-1: Comparison of Industrial and Symbiotic paradigms (adapted from 
Perlmutter and Trist (1986:3-8)) 
Economic literature cites the profit motive, return on equity, and satisfaction 
of its shareholders as the only goals that should concern a business organization.  
All activities of the firm are to support this objective while humanistic and 
ecological issues should be addressed through government policy (Friedman, 
1970).  Companies operating under the “Industrial” paradigm are: 
in business to produce goods and services and to make money for their 
owners; everything else [is] seen as a distraction at best, a threat to 
corporate survival at worst.  Ideas such as workplace diversity, 
community involvement, employee empowerment, work-family balance, 
and environmental stewardship [are] dismissed by executives as 
amorphous, feel-good concepts with little or no relevance to the business 
at hand (Makower, 1994:10).  
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Paradigm I is what we see represented in the commercial industrial growth 
society.  The firm is an individualistic element of the community, not a core 
component of the community that has an equal power position with the other 
stakeholders of the community.  Traditionally, the business organization has 
needs that are asymmetrical to the needs of the employee and society in general.   
Paradigm I is based on premises, values, and modes of interaction that 
make dominance and dependency a central preoccupation in societal and 
inter-societal relations.  Preoccupation with dominance leads to 
expansion, accumulation of resources, the maintenance of order through 
hierarchy, and the tight control of subordinates inside and outside the 
organization (Perlmutter and Trist, 1986:3). 
The business organization is seen as a discreet entity, its interactions with the 
surrounding environment being the result of threats and opportunities.  
Egocentric organizations that tend to become preoccupied with and to over 
emphasize the importance of themselves, while underplaying the significance of the wider 
system of relationships in which they exist are the operating norm (Morgan, 
1986:243).  Self-referencing, to the exclusion of the other stakeholders’ needs, 
leads to development of important tensions.   
These tensions give rise to conflict with the external stakeholders, and to 
antagonism, disharmony, and a turbulent environment for the business 
organization to operate within (Trist, 1979).  Without managing the demands 
being placed on it, and adapting to the demands of the environment surrounding 
it through co-operation and collaboration, the firm will lose its position as a 
player (Trist, 1979). 
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2.2.1 Paradigm S as an emergent paradigm 
Rather than continuing to operate in an increasingly hostile and crisis-ridden 
environment, the firm can search for a new paradigm to operate under.  The goal 
of the new operating paradigm is to create a harmonious environment with the 
stakeholders, with the development of trust, an absolute prerequisite for effective 
co-operation (Spencer, 1997).  Through the act of seeking collaboration, this trust 
relationship is built.  Ouchi, in applying Dirkheim’s perspective on co-operation, 
believes that trust increases economic efficiency, that is transaction costs1 associated 
with an exchange will be much less if the parties trust each other  (Maitland, Bryson, 
and Van de Ven, 1976:63).  The commitment to a win-win partnership and 
excellent channels of communications are also required for the success of the 
partnership. 
The Symbiotic Paradigm will position the firm so that it will fit into society’s 
future needs; a humanist, collective, integrative vision.  The symbiotic paradigm 
does not exclude the characteristics of Paradigm I, but repositions them into a 
changed and broader context.  There is acknowledgment of the value of a two-
way relationship of interdependence.  Dominance and dependency are replaced by a 
                                                
1 Transaction costs are the negotiating, monitoring, and enforcement costs that have to 
be borne to allow an exchange between two parties to take place. (Jones and Hill, 
1988:160).  Williamson defines them as any costs necessarily incidental to a 
transaction or series of transactions that are incurred above and beyond the cost 
of production.  These costs are principally associated with trying to guard 
against opportunism (Williamson, 1975).  He later defines transaction costs as 
those costs involving the planning, adapting, and modifying of contracts and 
administrative costs (1985). 
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balance of interdependence and independence (Perlmutter and Trist, 1986:19).  
Paradigm S is a process rather than a fixed state, where there is a collective 
vision, with the philosophy based on the logic of co-operation, instead of 
individualistic goal driven industrial and bureaucratic paradigms (Craig, 1989).  
In Arnstein’s (1969) ordering of citizen’s participation, society will have moved 
from “non-participation”, which includes manipulation as a mode of operation 
by the business firm, to an arena that encompasses consultation, placation, 
partnership, and delegated power by the firm towards the public.  Conflict 
resolution literature argues that the participation process diffuses tensions and 
emerging crisis’s (Buchy and Hoverman, 2000). 
Degree of citizen power 8 Citizen control
7 Delegated power
Degree of Tokenism 6 Partnerships
5 Placation
4 Consultation
3 Informing
Non-participation 2 Therapy
1 Manipulation
 
Table 2-2: Degree of citizen integration into the firm (Arnstein, 1969)  
Under Paradigm S, the business operations paradigm that seeks convergence 
in their interaction with the community, rather than divergence, is desirable.  
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These models of interaction are framed around co-operation and collaboration.  
They can take the form of: networks; strategic alliances; joint-ventures; co-
operatives; co-management boards; and co-operative entrepreneurships 
(Morrison, 1991). 
Assertive
Attempting to
satisfy oneÕs
own concerns
Unassertive Avoiding Accommodating
 
Figure 2-1: Reconciling ones concerns with other’s (Morgan, 1986:192) 
Organizational networking is a form of social interaction, taking the form of 
an informal mutual aid relationship or being as formal as co-determination. The 
latter, as defined by Morgan, is the form of rule where opposing parties combine in the 
joint management of mutual interests, as in coalition government or corpratism, each 
party drawning on a specific powerbase  (1986:145).  Networking is seen as necessary 
to keep abreast with the market, technology and needs of the customer (Peters, 
1992).  The network’s capability is its ability to bring knowledge to the situation 
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at hand quickly.  Alliances are seen as a way of operating in an interconnected 
world. 
Grey (1989) explores “what is collectively good”, and how can the 
organization satisfy its own interests within this context?  Collaboration is: 
a process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem 
can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that 
go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible.  The objective of 
collaboration is to create a richer, more comprehensive appreciation of the 
problem among the stakeholders than any one of them could construct 
alone (5). 
The collaborative model gives the community the forum to reaffirm 
themselves as community in the face of adversity. A shared stewardship 
becomes the means for organizing across organizations to manage interdependence  
(Grey, 1989:270).  Joint gains instead of individual gains become the objective.  
Wilkinson (1996) stressed that without a change in consciousness and the 
development of support structures, the community will be unable to change its 
paradigm readily.  Craig (1989) develops a similar argument from the 
organizational perspective, the firm needing to adopt a collaborative paradigm 
of operations if it is to be able to respond readily to a changing landscape. 
2.2.2 Reconciling the needs and aspirations of the Forest Industry and Resource-
Dependent Community 
Community can be defined based on three elements: location, social system, 
and a common identity (Flora, 1992).  Community offers a sense of identity, a set 
of social institutions, and a place.  Beckley (1998a) defines the debate of the 
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definition of the rural community as one of an interest focus versus one of a 
geographic focus.  The community is seen as having “a shared set of interests 
and institutional affiliations” or “a common geographical context or a 
combination of both.”  The forestry community that is seeking co-management 
and utilization of the region’s forestry resource locally is a stakeholder 
community of geography due to the location of the town and it’s resources and 
also a community of common identity framed around it’s interests of improved 
economic betterment for the region’s citizens.  There is a unification of vision for 
the geographic community.  With this unification of a vision of local control of 
the forestry resource, other geographic communities can join into this 
community, creating a community clustering that increases the presence and 
political sway of this stakeholder group.  In British Columbia, over forty 
communities have formed a coalition or community of identity that is seeking 
increased geographic community resource management from the provincial 
forest management authorities (Copeland, 1999). 
Communities have a desire to prosper.  They increasingly view the resources 
that they are endowed with as a source of economic capital to aid in their 
prosperity.  As community stakeholders acquire greater influence in the 
management of the resource, the firm’s managers have to give greater credence 
to the community.  Trust, loyalty, norms, and networks are elements of co-
operative behavior and influences management’s relationship to the community 
leaders (Wall et al, 1998).  With trust and a strong network between communities 
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of the region and with the firm, there is an increased tendency to take into 
account the community’s needs and desires in terms of forest planning, local 
hiring, and direct community investment process.     
To what degree and in what form does the firm include the resource 
community as a stakeholder/partner?  What are the economic effects 
experienced by the firm from taking various stances in relationship to the 
community?  To fully anticipate the effect of the community on the allocation of 
the resources, the firm needs to examine the current and future: 
• Perceived empowerment of the community; 
• Social profits2 distributed to the community;  
• Relationships between the government as a regulator and the 
community; 
• Rise in community demands for return of ownership rights; and 
• Weakening of corporate ownership of the resource through 
legislation.  
Its resource endowment forms the basis or foundation for the firm’s existence 
and the source of its profit. This endowment of Crown assets is delineated by 
Provincial legislative action. The regulatory body has the final say in the 
allocation unless the community takes direct action.  If there is a perception that 
the firm is decreasing the capital3 of the region, then regulatory actions are taken 
                                                
2 The term social profit includes a broader range of benefits to the community 
than just economic profit.  There are social, economic, and ecological dimensions.  
3 Bourdieu defines various forms of capital as: 
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that could include fines and/or loss of fiber allocation.  From this framework, 
management can assess whether the community(ies) can add or subtract from 
their long-term profits. The salience of the community stakeholders to the firm is 
dependent on their power to sway government resource or property-rights 
allocation, the ability of the community to take direct action to limit the resource 
from leaving the region, the needs of the firm for a local labour pool, and general 
corporate policy. 
The question remains how to implement this model, and which 
organizational paradigm could best serve the needs of the community and the 
forestry firm. For this research, the original Trist delineations were adapted and 
applied to the forestry sector and defined, respectively, as Industrial Forestry 
(IF), Localized-Forestry (LF), and Collaborative-Forestry (CF or SF) (Table 2-3).  
Under the Symbiotic paradigm, communities and forestry firms are looking 
for a common solution, with the company treating the community as a 
                                                                                                                                            
“[C]apital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic 
capital, which is immediately convertible into money and may be 
institutionalized in the form of property rights; as cultural capital, which 
is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be 
institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications; and as social 
capital, made up of social obligations (‘connections’), which is convertible, 
in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in 
the form of title of nobility” (1986:243). 
Hawken (1999) includes ecological or natural capital in the broader definitions of 
capital. 
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partner/stakeholder, assisting them in their own development and sustainability 
with neither player dominating the outcomes to strictly suit their own individual 
interests.  Collaborative-Forestry seeks to maximize benefits to the firm and 
community and acknowledges that they are interlinked.  For the community to 
become part of this paradigm, they need to be included as stakeholders in the 
decision processes.  For the community to overcome resistance to their inclusion 
into the economic development available from the area’s resources, they have 
two mechanisms available; the acquiring and enforcement of property rights to 
the wood fiber or the adoption of co-management/utilization of the resource.  
They gain access to the resource through enforcement against the industrial 
property rights holder or active participation with the industrial partner.  
Enforcement of access is usually a political process, either via direct action or 
with government acting as intermediaries (Beckley and Korber, 1996).  The firm 
is forced to the negotiating table, where the outcome is perceived to be one of 
competition or possibly compromise.  There is still a win - lose philosophy on the 
part of the representatives of the firm.  As an alternative, the forestry firm can co-
operate. 
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Social Institutions  Industrial Forestry Localized  Forestry Collaborative 
Forestry 
“Rationality” of 
system 
Private economic 
(Malenfant, 1997); 
win-lose 
“Eco-centric”; 
localized to the 
exclusion of the 
outside 
Multiple objective - 
social economic with 
limits on the system 
by eco-system 
requirements; 
consensual (Story and 
Lickers,1997)  
Government  In lockstep with 
industry’s 
“needs”(Malenfant, 
1997) 
Government as a non-
legitimate partner, 
with no rights 
Government as a 
decentralized partner, 
system policy maker 
Technology High technology with 
the goal to minimize 
labour costs and 
disruptions 
Low to intermediate 
technologies with the 
goal to distance 
themselves from the 
“capitalist” system 
Use of high 
technology to 
minimize ecological 
impact, provide safe, 
high value jobs, and 
lower cost timber for 
industry 
Economic system 
objective 
Maximum profits for 
the firm 
Minimal capital; 
disconnection from 
the system; 
philosophical 
survival; 
Maximum benefits for 
society and local 
communities 
Eco-system 
objective 
Primacy of the 
anthropocentric 
Primacy of the 
perceived eco-system 
needs over anthro-
centric needs; humans 
are not considered 
part of the ecosystem 
Anthropocentric 
needs as a component 
of the eco-systems 
survival 
Sustainability 
economically 
socially 
environmentally 
Nonsustainable to the 
local community and 
the ecosystem 
(Bernard and Young, 
1997) 
Ecologically 
sustainable; socially if 
economic needs are 
minimal; eliminates 
industry from the 
picture 
Sustainable through 
the balancing of the 
needs of labour, the 
mill, community use 
of the forest, and the 
ecosystem  
Table 2-3: Industrial Forestry, Localized Forestry, Collaborative Forestry - Social 
Institutional Relationship 
 
 Page 20 
 2.3 Forestry Resource Property Rights 
The ability to consume directly or convert the forest resources into products 
implies rights to the resource.  Property rights specify how benefits and harms 
are designated to persons or are externalized4 to others, and who must pay 
whom to modify the actions made by affected parties (Mitchell and Carson, 
1986).  Barzel defines economic property rights as the individual’s ability to 
directly control the consumption of the services of an asset, or to consume it 
indirectly through exchange (1997:90).  Legal rights are what the government 
delineates and enforces as a person’s economic property.  Legal ownership is a 
means to internalize the economic benefits from the resource.   
In Canada, forests are generally in state ownership5 (de jure rights).  
Canadian Crown timber leases, as a form of forestry resource tenure, have been 
in force since the middle of the 19th century.  There is a transfer of only subsets of 
rights – the firm gets the right to the wood fiber in return for payment of 
royalties and/or ground rents, plus the requirement of some degree of forest 
                                                
4 Externalities occur where there is a discrepancy between the private marginal 
product and the social cost(s) from an economic activity (Conybeare, 1980).  A 
classic case of this would be the pollution to a river eco-system by improper 
logging practices.  The forestry company and the loggers are not directly 
affected, but gain from their activity, while the fish, other wildlife, fishermen, 
downstream residents, etc. are all affected negatively. 
5 Of a total forested area of 471.6 million ha, only 6% or 25.1 million ha is in 
private or industrial woodlots (Natural Resource Canada, 1999).  The majority of 
the private woodlot ownership is in Quebec and New Brunswick. 
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management.  Crown forest tenures vary from province to province, but share a 
number of common traits.  These are: 
• There is generally the conference of exclusive rights to the wood 
fiber, without the granted rights being comprehensive; 
• The allotments are either volume or land area based;  
• The duration of the tenures are limited or fixed, with time periods 
of one to five years being the norm for smaller operators, to twenty 
to twenty-five years for the larger industrial players.  There is often 
a renewal clause in the contract, where the a window of renewal 
opens every five years, with the contract then being extended for 
another full term with the accepting of the new requirements 
(Natural Resource Canada, 1999). 
 These tenure systems are economic contracts created by the Government, 
conferring economic rights and timber management responsibilities for the wood 
fiber to other parties.  This is a means for the Government to increase the net 
gains from the forests through the division of commodity ownership (Barzel, 
1997).  The production objective guides the government in its assignment of 
rights to the forest. (Laarman, 1995)  In Canada, this objective has been embodied 
through economic development and the industrial development of the forestry.   
Forests provide a source of new jobs, raising the national income, but they also 
impose social, environmental, and political costs on a country (Laarman, 1995). 
Present Saskatchewan forest tenure licenses assign the Crown rights to the 
wood fiber to the forestry firm in return for stumpage payments.  The local 
community does not have a direct say in the management of the forest and 
receives none of the stumpage payments.  Effectively, the Government has 
converted a community’s forestry commons to a Government property, which 
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then preempts the local community from reasserting their right to the wood 
fiber.  Due to the perceived disparity in allocation of benefits derived from the 
resource, the community becomes concerned about economic rights and 
governance over the resource. Economic property rights of tangible and 
intangible resources, and the resulting conversion into economic capital by the 
firm becomes the focus of the community/firm interaction.  
Coase (1960) suggests that, absent transaction costs, the distribution of 
property rights is non-consequential to economic efficiency.  The wealth 
distribution may not be socially optimal, but is economically efficient.  The 
Pigovian6 solution to the creation of externalities or an imperfect distribution of 
cost and benefits from the resource is to use government action, i.e. taxes, to 
rebalance the situation.  The problem with this solution is that the community 
does not directly have access to the taxes except in the form of social services.   In 
northern single-resource communities, forestry resources are the only means of 
improving their economic well-being.  To affect a shift in the firm’s operating 
paradigm from I to S, within a world that continues to operate under Paradigm I, 
the community has to acquire the property rights to the wood fiber that the firm 
now holds.   
                                                
6 Pigou suggested that the role for governments is to efficiently allocate resources 
by inducing private actors to internalize externalities through taxation, i.e. 
making the producer of externalities liable for the harmful effects. (Conybeare, 
1980) 
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At the international level, there has been a call for a more local ownership and 
management to provide for sustainable communities and reduce 
impoverishment (United Nations, 1992). The community has to take actions to 
reassert their legal property rights to local resources as a response to the 
perceived inequitable distribution of economic property rights and the resulting 
lack of wealth generation for the community.  These actions could take the form 
of: 
• Legal action against the state and the firm to change the resource 
property rights allocation or resource tenure between the state and 
the firm; or 
• Civil disobedience to block access to or withhold resources from 
the firm, forcing them to share the economic wealth generated by 
the resource with the community. 
The community moves to withhold the fiber supply, get the property rights 
reassigned, and seek alternative uses for the wood fiber that yield greater returns 
on their equity. 
As an alternative, the firm and the community can choose active participation 
as their collaborative or co-operative operating system.  The firm and the 
community would partner in sharing the wealth generated from the resource. 
The firm is still assertive in regards to its concerns, but it views the community’s 
desires as valid and mutual satisfaction as the objective.  The outcome of this co-
operation is a forestry firm that now includes in its operating paradigm: 
• Mechanisms for stakeholder interaction; 
• Property rights to the wood fiber that is not readily challenged; 
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• Sharing of the decision process; 
• Maximization of local profits; 
• Meeting the needs of the local people and the forestry firm; and 
• Sustaining the social fabric. 
The community is transformed from one of dependence to a community of 
stakeholders.  With this paradigm shift from an Industrial logic, that favors 
exchange value, to a Collaborative Forestry paradigm, that favors quality of life, 
the community becomes an active participant, redefining the structures that 
affect it (Copeland, 1999).  The major forestry firm will experience benefits by 
operating in a more harmonious, less turbulent, environment.  The forestry 
tenure is still held by the firm, but the community that the resource is being 
drawn from derives a return on its fair share of the forest equity.   
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Considerations 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 addresses the use of game-theory to assess strategic decision 
making on the part of the firm and the community.  Section 3.2 defines the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game.  The PD game will be used to assess the results 
of actions and the resulting responses between the community and forestry firm 
to adopting a co-operative or non-co-operative stance with each other.  Section 
3.3 defines the Resource-constraint model in broad theoretic terms, with the 
model being implemented into a non-co-operative PD game in Section 3.4. 
3.2 Game-Theory and Strategic decision making 
Game-theory is concerned with decision-making.  It provides a structure for 
the description of conscious, goal-oriented decision-making processes involving one or 
more individuals  (Shubik, 1972:37).  Bacharach defines a game as having four 
elements: 
• A well-defined set of possible strategies for each player; 
• Well-defined preferences of each player among possible outcomes 
of the game; 
• The player’s outcome is interdependent on the other player’s 
course of action in the game;  
• All players have full knowledge of the strategies and expected 
payoffs (1977).  
Games are either non-co-operative or co-operative.  The co-operative game is 
defined as a game where the players have the ability to communicate and 
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negotiate an enforceable contract.  In the non-co-operative game, players can or 
cannot communicate depending on the rule-set, but there is no enforceability of 
the contract.  In all games, whether co-operative or non-co-operative, there is 
interdependence between the players. It is through this interdependence that 
organizational strategies should be understood as rational actions between 
parties (Aram, 1989).   
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game models a non-zero-sum game7 between 
two players with two strategies per player. It applies to enterprise-constituent 
relations in which parties are organized and active, the long-term ability of each group to 
attain its goals depends on the survival and success of the other and the most desirable 
outcomes for {each of} the interdependent parties in an immediate situation are 
incompatible  (Aram, 1989:268).  
Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game 
  
Player B 
 
  Silent Defect 
Player A Silent (3,3) (0,5) 
 Defect (5,0) (1,1) 
Figure 3-1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Camerer, 1991) 
                                                
7 Zero-sum refers to games of pure opposition, where the winning player 
acquires the entire payoff, with the other player losing an equal amount (Shubik, 
1972).  A Non-Zero-Sum game gives each player various degrees of payoff, with 
the resulting bundle not equaling zero.  By their nature, the goals of the players 
in a non-zero-sum game are not necessarily directly opposed and there is no 
longer a clear conflict of interest.  
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The non-co-operative or traditional PD game, models a single iteration game, 
with each player aware of the others possible strategies and payoffs.  They move 
simultaneously. Because of the non-iterative/repetitive nature of the game, there 
is no feedback loop to the other player to develop trust in the other player’s 
choice and enforce a contract between them.  The players are non-trusting and 
are seeking the best outcome for themselves exclusive of the other party’s 
welfare.  It demonstrates the consequences of non-co-operative behavior between 
two parties, and illustrates the importance of trust in relationships (Aram, 1989). 
The players can choose to keep silent or defect, without coalition building or 
information transfer between the players (Table 3-1).  Player A can be “Silent”, 
resulting in the best play of “Defect” by Player B to maximize his immediate self-
gain8, yielding a payoff pair of (0,5).  If the player chooses to “Defect”, the other 
player’s best choice is still to “Defect”, therefore “Defect” dominates the game.  
However, when both players pursue this logic, they are both worse off than if 
they had maintained their silence (payoff=(1,1) instead of (3,3)), yielding the 
Nash equilibrium or outcome for a non-co-operative game (Shubik, 1972; 
Camerer, 1997).  This leads to a sub-optimal solution or a Pareto-inefficient state 
(Binmore, 1994). 
                                                
8 Shubik defines the difference between individual and social rationality to be: 
individual rationality calls for the individual to refuse to take less than he can get by 
himself.  Societal rationality suggests that the group as a whole should always be efficient 
regardless of how it divides [the] total product among participants (1972:50) 
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If the rules of the PD game are relaxed and allow communication, and more 
importantly enforceable co-operation, the payoffs can improve.  There is a 
reduction or elimination of uncertainty in the play or action of the other player, 
and hence the players move from the defensive solution to one of mutual 
maximization.  Under a co-operative game, with the players choosing a course of 
action, and the resulting payoff pair together, there is a Pareto-improvement  
(Bacharach, 1977; Binmore, 1994).  In the game illustrated above (Figure 3-1), 
there is a unique solution of co-operate:co-operate -> (3,3).  In order to advance 
their own individual interests, accommodation and coordinated behavior, i.e. co-
operation, is often necessary. 
3.3   Industrial vs. Collaborative Forestry Strategies Expressed 
as a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
 The game is defined as a Prisoner’s Dilemma with a decision space of two 
players, with two strategies on the part of each player, the community and the 
firm.  The firm can choose to continue with Industrial Forestry Paradigm (IF) and 
not acknowledge the community’s economic property rights to a portion of the 
wood fiber, or it can collaborate under a Collaborative Forestry Paradigm (CF).  
Lejano and Davis view this as an:  
efficiency/equity dilemma, where efficiency might favor centralized 
regional facilities so as to take advantage of economies of scale, whereas 
equity might favor more dispersed siting schemes to equitably distribute 
the … impacts of these facilities among participating communities 
(2002:251).   
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ThePrisoner’s Dilemma game is analyzed, testing the hypothesis that co-
operation on the part of the firm, as manifested under Paradigm CF, is in the 
firm’s long-run self-interest. 
The community’s actions depend on the enforceable claim9 (0%, 25%, 50%, 
75%, 100%) that they can establish over wood fiber leaving the region 
unprocessed by their labour force.  Depending on the power of the community, it 
will move to limit the exodus of forest resources from the region if there is 
enough of a discrepancy between what the firm offers as economic returns, and 
what the community perceives as its rightful returns from its economic rights.  
Under the Community resource withholding strategy: 
• The community would negotiate, at the onset, with the firm for 
decentralized processing facility to be placed in their community in 
return for the use of the wood fiber from the region; or 
• They would holdup the supply of wood fiber to the mill through 
legal and/or direct action in the form of blockades. This is where 
the Government is introduced into the game-theoretic model, 
through judicial challenge(s) to the current Forest License 
Agreement or other contracts that allocate wood to the firm; and 
• The community would reallocate what is decided as their equity 
share of the wood fiber to their own processing facility and market 
channels.  
                                                
9 The Government and/or the Judicial system have to recognize this as the 
community’s equity.  Without this, the community can move to holdup 100% of 
the wood fiber in the short-term, but this is considered a non-enforceable threat 
for the sake of gaming unless the community can affect a governmental or firm 
buy-in through its direct action. 
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Graphically, the game, presented in its strategic or normal form, is depicted 
in Figure 3-2. 
  Forestry Firm  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  decentralize 
production 
centralize 
production 
Community Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
NPV of actions 
of each party 
based on 
strategy 
NPV of actions 
of each party 
based on 
strategy 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
NPV of actions 
of each party 
based on 
strategy 
NPV of actions 
of each party 
based on 
strategy 
Figure 3-2: The Community and the Forestry Firm Actions under PD 
Payoffs are based on the Net Present Value (NPV) of ten years of cashflows 
from each party’s actions/reactions under each strategy.  This is expressed in the 
formula: 
NPV= [CF1/(1+k)1+ CF2/(1+k)2+ …+ CFn/(1+k)n]-C (Brigham et al., 1985)(1) 
where:  
NPV is the Net Present Value of future cashflows; 
CF is the period’s cashflows; 
k is the cost of capital; and 
C is the original capital investment. 
The discount rate used in the calculation of NPV is: 
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k=A + R + I,    
where: 
•  k is the time value or discount rate of a future money stream.  This 
rate generally runs between 5-9%; 
• A is the interest cost of a risk-free alternative use of the money.  
Usually 3-5%; 
• R is the interest rate premium based on the risk of the investment 
payback; 
• I is the expected inflation rate over the time of the project.  
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Chapter 4 
Forestry Community Development and Oriented Strand 
Board Manufacturing in Northwest Saskatchewan 
4.1 Introduction 
Based on the model of collaboration, how does the forestry system shift to the 
new paradigm? Industry has to be presented with a system that includes strong 
economic benefits for themselves, care for the ecosystem, and that is conducive 
to the current demands of society and industry. 
There have been a number of Collaborative Forestry successes in northwest 
Saskatchewan, notably, NorSask Forest Products, owned by the Meadow Lake 
Tribal Council (MLTC).  Several northern Metis villages have observed the 
success of the MLTC forestry enterprise, and are implementing a similar model 
for their communities in the form of North West Community Wood Products 
Ltd. (NWC), based in Beauval, Saskatchewan.  NWC’s mandate is to make the 
NWC a major owner in the regional northwest forest economy  (Hatton, 2001). 
The reallocation of wood fiber10 from Millar-Western, Meadow Lake; 
Weyerhaeuser Canada, Price Albert; and NorSask, Meadow Lake has given rise 
to business opportunities for other industrial and community forestry players.  
Tolko Forest Industries Ltd., a privately held Canadian forestry products 
                                                
10 The majority of this reallocated fiber is aspen, a lower density hardwood and 
broad leaf deciduous tree.  
 Page 33 
company from Vernon, B.C., is establishing an Oriented Strand Board (OSB) 
Plant 26 km southeast of Meadow Lake, SK.  Tolko, in establishing an OBS mill 
has partnered with the Saskatchewan Crown Investments Corporation (CIC), 
NWC, and the Meadow Lake Tribal Council (MLTC). Tolko has a majority 
position (70%), managing and marketing the product from the OSB facility.  
(Meadow Lake OSB Limited Partnership, 2003).   
Local NWC community economic benefits could be increased by the 
installation of a remote strander facility at Beauval Forks, SK.  This facility, 
assumed to be owned by Tolko, would process local roundwood and residuals 
from the NWC mill and other local sawmills into strands suitable as feedstock for 
the Meadow Lake OSB plant.  This research examines the effects of 
decentralizing the OSB feedstock manufacturing process to the remote 
community from where the resource is harvested.  
4.2 Historical Background of Collaborative Forestry in Northwest 
Saskatchewan 
The NorSask Forest Management License Agreement area, located in the 
northwest region of Saskatchewan, is unique in the province with local 
community members inclusion into the creation of an institutional structure that 
include local views, values and concerns (Beckley and Korber, 1996).  The 
resulting institutional structure, labeled co-management, is a co-operative 
resource management regime.   
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The affected communities/stakeholder groups, as defined by the northern fur 
block boundaries11, have become the driving force for the adoption of the co-
management model of forest development (Anderson, 1995).  Local stakeholders 
consider it the responsibility of NorSask Forest Products Ltd. (NorSask)12 to carry 
out the economic development vision of local stakeholders, as well as providing 
a forum for the community to participate in co-operative management of the 
forest.  
Treaty Indian stakeholders have accomplished this through indirect 
ownership (MLTC as 100% owners of NorSask) and political presence. Anderson 
observed that as First Nations, they:  
“acknowledge the necessity of participation in the global economy and are 
attempting to create a distinct mode of development.  Central to that 
mode is a strategy of business creation in various forms of partnerships 
and alliances (supply contracts, subcontracting, joint ventures, etc.) with 
other First Nations and non-First Nations. .... First Nations’ values, 
traditions, and organizational structures demand input from, and control 
by, people at the “grassroots“(Anderson, 1995:126). 
These values were actualized at the corporate structural level and community 
economic development level. Millar-Western, a business partner, was to build 
and operate the pulp mill necessary to utilize the aspen wood fiber from the 
                                                
11 The northern fur conservation blocks, as defined by the Saskatchewan 
Government, are used to define stakeholder management board membership 
boundaries.  The co-management boards are selected from residents within that 
region. 
12 NorSask is a Spruce/Fir/Pine (SPF) dimension mill that manufactures 
primarily 2X3, 2X4, 2X6 framing lumber for shipment to the U.S. housing market. 
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region.  The inclusion of the community was multi-faceted, with local harvesting 
contracts being tendered to community-based contractors.  Forestry management 
decisions are jointly made by the Forestry Branch of the Saskatchewan 
government, Mistik Management (owned by NorSask and Millar-Western) and a 
local resource management board from the fur-block where harvesting is 
proposed.  This is a major shift in forestry corporate practice:  historically, industry 
has accommodated societal demand for greater public involvement in forest management 
only after legislative or policy change required them to do so, or in reaction to 
particularly effective popular protest (blockades, boycotts, and the like)  (Beckley and 
Korber, 1996:14). 
The operations of the co-management model, as implemented in the NorSask 
Forest Management License Area (FMLA), provided a number of lessons 
(Beckley and Korber, 1996).  These lessons include: 
• The need for clear and open lines of communication at all times; 
• The need to define the boundaries: included parties (i.e. stakeholders) 
versus those excluded from participating or defining the structure;  
• That the existing structure and embedded culture may have significant 
barriers to the development of consensual decision making (Beckley and 
Korber, 1996:15). 
Co-management implementation in the NorSask FLMA attempts to satisfy 
the stakeholders involved in the process.  Although a number of conflicts have 
arisen over harvesting methods and rights to wood supply by local small 
operators, the process continues to move forward.  The Co-management boards 
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are looking at increasing the scope of their authority to include all resource 
issues.   
4.3 Meadow Lake Partnership Ltd. Oriented Strand Board Plant13 
at Meadow Lake, Saskatchewan 
Tolko Industries Ltd. is a private family owned Canadian forestry company 
with its head office in Vernon, B.C.  Tolko employs over 2,300 people, with 
manufacturing divisions in British Columbia, Alberta, and Manitoba. Its 
Manufacturing plants produce lumber, kraft paper, and panel and engineered 
wood products (Tolko Annual Review 2001).  Sales in 2002 were $896 million 
(Tolko Annual Review 2002).  The majority of Tolko operations are located in the 
B.C. interior (Figure 4-1), while the High Level, AB and Meadow Lake, SK OSB 
plants are expected to lead future growth for the company. 
                                                
13 While this research examines the situation of Tolko Forest Industries Ltd. and 
North West Community Wood Products Ltd., the data used to derive the 
financial assumptions of the parties is based on the author’s previous work as an 
community development consultant, and was not provided by Tolko.  The result 
is that the financial assumptions and the resulting player’s payoffs are specific to 
their geographic location, but are generic to the industry, not one particular 
firm’s operation.  The research is a synthetic exercise that does not to precisely 
mirror the financial operations of these firms. 
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Figure 4-1: Map of Tolko operations (http//:www.Tolko.com) 
In June 2001, Tolko signed a partnering agreement with the Saskatchewan 
Crown Investments Corporation (CIC), the Meadow Lake Tribal Council 
(MLTC), and North West Communities Forest Products (NWC) to build an 
Oriented Strand Board (OSB) manufacturing facility south of Meadow Lake, 
Saskatchewan.  Tolko is a 70% managing partner, and NWC presently has 1.5% 
share and will have a 10% ownership position once it buys the additional shares 
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from CIC.  The environmental review, financing, and final site selection was 
completed in the summer of 2002, with actual construction of the plant planned 
for September 2002.  With an eighteen months construction phase, the first 
product rolled off the line in December 2003. 
In 2001, North American panel production was 7.6 billion square feet (3/8” 
basis) or 19.4 million cubic meters (Structural Board Association, 2003).  The 
majority of this is used in residential construction for floor systems, exterior wall 
sheathing, roof sheathing, and exterior siding.  Originally introduced in 1964, 
OSB, an engineered wood fiber based structural panel formed from long strands, 
is becoming a major substitute for construction plywood.  Because it is an 
engineered product, it can be custom manufactured to meet customer 
specifications in thickness, density, panel size, surface texture, strength, and 
rigidity.   
The plant will produce 600 million sq.ft./yr (3/8” basis) or about 20 million 4’ 
x 8’ sheets per year.  One cubic meter of OSB (equivalent to 31 sheets of 4 x 8 x 
3/8”) requires 1.6 cubic meters of solid wood equivalent in roundwood, with the 
plant requiring a wood supply of 900,000 cubic meters per year14.  Of this, 90,000 
cubic meters will come from the NWC region.  It will operate 3 shifts per day, 
with a direct employment of 130 people from the Meadow Lake area.   
                                                
14 To place this volume in context, 900,000 cubic meters of tree-length logs, 
stacked 10 meters high, would form a stack of wood approximately 28 km long.  
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The Meadow Lake OSB Partnership is not pursuing a Forest Management 
Agreement with the province for timber supply for the plant.  The wood supply 
will come from already established third party Timber Supply Licenses and 
private/Crown leased woodlots south of Meadow Lake.  The wood species that 
the plant processes: Aspen, Black Poplar, Birch, and Jack Pine are all currently 
underutilized in the Province (Stantec, 2001).   
The process steps in the production of OSB at the Meadow Lake plant are: 
1. Harvesting of aspen (70%), black poplar (7%), Jack Pine/Black 
Spruce15 (22%), and Birch (<1%) into 8 or 16 ft bolts using 
mechanized cut-to-length logging equipment.  Harvesting will be 
carried out by independent contractors from wood source regions. 
Because of mechanized harvesting, the employment per cubic 
meter of fiber harvested will be low, with the 90,000 cubic meters 
from NWC’s region yielding 6 to 10 harvesting jobs; 
2. The transportation of the bolts from the source region to the plant 
will be by carried out by independent trucking contractors, 
utilizing Super-B trailers to maximize the legal payload hauled and 
minimize the cost of roundwood transport.  22,500 loads of logs are 
anticipated to enter the mill-yard, with 80% of that delivered in the 
winter to take advantage of the increased legal haul weights.  Of 
this total, 10% or 2,250 loads would be from the NWC region; 
3. Once in the mill-yard, the bolts will be offloaded and inventoried 
by overhead crane, with a six month supply of logs to be stored at 
any one time; 
                                                
15 Boreal softwoods are unique in that their physical properties yield an OSB 
panel that is comparable to those using the tradition deciduous wood fibers.  
This can give the northern OSB mills a production cost advantage by utilizing 
softwood waste residue from dimension mills. For many of the community-
based dimension mills, this would give them an additional source of revenue, 
enhancing their profitability (Gary Stein, Director of Research, Tolko, personal 
communications).   
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4. The logs to be processed will be placed in log conditioning ponds, 
where the logs will move slowly through the heated water (45C) for 
eight hours.  This prepares the wood for debarking and stranding, 
brings the fiber to an even temperature throughout, and allows a 
higher feedrate into the strander knives; 
5. After the strand production, the wet strands are conveyed into 
metering bins for temporary storage; 
6. From the wet strand metering bins, strands will be dried in a 
biomass-energy fired dryer, and stored in dry strand metering bins 
for feeding into the mat production line;  
7. Blenders introduce the structural resin and waxes into the strands,  
which are then moved into the forming line where the strands are 
oriented and formed into mats; 
8. The actual OSB panels are formed from the layers of mat, and put 
through heat presses, where the combination of high heat (177C-
224C) and pressure creates the final panel;  
9. The OSB panels are then sawn to size, stacked and strapped, ready 
for rail transport to market. 
4.4 North West Communities Wood Products Ltd. 
North West Communities Wood Products, Ltd (NWC) is a corporate entity 
owned equally and exclusively by the Northern Metis communities of Beauval, 
Buffalo Narrows, Green Lake, Ile a la Crosse, La Loche, Pataunak, and 
Pinehouse, with a Board of Directors consisting of members appointed from each 
of the seven communities. The member communities came together to foster co-
operative development of the forest resource in order to promote economic and 
social development within the communities and the region as a whole. It is 
anticipated that further discussion will be required to involve other Metis 
communities in the Region, notably Buffalo Narrows, Jans Bay and Cole Bay 
(NWC, 2000). 
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NWC has set several development goals. These include:  
“the achievement of economic self sufficiency for NWC by the creation of 
viable economic projects for NWC,”  
“to make the NWC a major owner in the Regional Northwest Forest 
Economy,”  
and finally, to  
“make the highest and best use of the lumber from the area, resulting in 
the creation of forestry jobs and wealth for the region”(Hatton, 2001)  
To derive the maximum economic value from their regional wood fiber, 
NWC has installed a combination softwood dimension and hardwood cut-stock 
mill at Beauval Forks, SK to process a portion of the 251,000 cubic meters of 
annual wood supply awarded to them under their acquired Timber Supply 
Agreement (TSL).   
NWC has an active interest in the western 2/3 of the Besnard Forest 
Management Block as well as the Churchill Forest Management Block, located 
north of Meadow Lake, SK.  On March 18, 1999, a Letter of Intent between the 
Minister responsible for Saskatchewan Environmental and Resource 
Management (SERM) and NWC specified the requirements for the formal 
assignment of the Besnard Block to NWC.  This marked the beginning of NWC's 
involvement in the Besnard area.  A second Letter of Intent was signed between 
NWC and the Minister responsible for SERM on February 12, 2001, outlining the 
conditions for inclusion of the Churchill Block into the NWC’s possession and 
the forest management responsibilities required. With the inclusion of La Loche, 
SK into NWC as a community partner, the Turner East and Turner West blocks 
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were brought into NWC’s authority  As a result, NWC’s total TSL annual harvest 
volume is 251,000 m3.  The Meadow Lake OSB partnership is allocated 90,0000 
m3 of hardwood, as a precondition for approval of NWC’s TSL, and 7,000 m3 low 
grade softwood culled from NWC’s sawmill; the Green Lake sawmill is allocated 
20,000 m3 hardwood and 40,000 m3 softwood as a condition of NWC’s 30% 
ownership in the mill, with 50,000 m3 additional softwood available for purchase 
by the mill.  NWC’s Beauval Forks operations will use 14,000 m3 for the post and 
pole plant; with 30,000 m3 aspen and 90,000 m3 of softwood processed by the 
dimension/cut-stock mill. 
In discussions with Tolko, NWC has indicated that the concept of a remote 
strander plant providing the Meadow Lake OSB mill with a wet aspen strand 
product to be located in Beauval Forks, , would be beneficial to the communities.  
Instead of the logs destined for the new Tolko OSB plant traversing the territory 
without NWC’s member communities deriving economic benefits, NWC would 
be involved in the custom processing of the Tolko logs at a remote strander 
facility. This would mean increased economic activity for the communities.   The 
remote strander wood mill would replicate the initial processing system of the 
Meadow Lake OSB mill, duplicating steps 3-5 (as defined above). The wet 
strands would be transported to the Meadow Lake OSB plant through NWC’’s 
trucking partnership with Northern Resource Trucking (NRT). The Meadow 
Lake mill would then store the strands in storage/metering bins for introduction 
into the dryers and further processing into the final product.  The capital, 
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production and management expertise requirements of the actual panel 
production dictate that it be implemented in a centralized site. 
NWC expects to achieve direct social and economic benefits from the remote 
stranding plant in the form of: 
• 2 plant operator jobs, a grinder/knife maintenance position, a loader 
operator, a yard operator position and an operations manager for a 
total salary increase for the region of $305,000; 
• Additional revenues for its sawmill from the sale of residuals; 
• The training and development of a technically skilled labour pool; 
• The training and development of a managerial pool; 
• The harvesting and hauling of the log supply; 
• A forum for more local entrepreneurs to create and/or expand their 
business; 
• A closing of the knowledge gap through training and exposure to 
modern business operations;  
• Financial dividends from the 50% ownership in NWC/NRT Trucking.  
NWC/NRT Trucking is expected to haul the roundwood from the 
bush, the wet strands to the ML OSB plant, and bundled sawmill 
residues from Canoe Narrows to Beauval Forks. 
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Chapter 5 
Application of the IF/CF PD Model to the Meadow Lake 
Partnership Ltd. OSB plant 
5.1 Introduction 
To test outcomes based on the interplays between the community and 
forestry firm from an installation of a remote stranding facility in Beauval, SK, 
this research applied the Prisoner’s Dilemma model delineated in Chapter 3.  
Applying Trist and Perlmutter’s paradigms to the PD  matrix , there were four 
strategy pairs for community, and the forestry firm: co-operate, co-operate; 
defect, co-operate; co-operate, defect; and defect, defect.  For the forestry firm, 
represented in this exercise by Meadow Lake OSB Partnership Ltd., a choice 
exists to pursue an Industrial Forestry Paradigm (IF) (defect), or a Collaborative 
Forestry Paradigm (CF) (co-operate), leading to either decentralizing the 
production of the strands from NWC’s wood fiber to the region (Remote 
Stranding (RS) or refusing to decentralize the production of wet strands (do not 
Remote Strand (nRS).  The community can choose not to act to limit the OSB 
plant access to the wood (co-operate – (do not holdup (nH), or to pursue political 
and/or legal means to holdup wood fiber (defect – holdup (H)), considered their 
equity, for alternative local processing facilities that will yield improved 
economic benefits to the community. 
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Under the theoretic non-co-operative PD game, the dominant solution is for 
both players to defect, the community holding up the wood fiber from the plant 
and the firm centralizing production.  They both lose in this situation, with the 
firm losing the marginal profits it would have had from the wood fiber.  The 
community loses a larger forestry firm with its resulting expertise and capital, 
and is forced to create a market for the wood fiber on its own.  
Assumptions at the start of the analysis were:  
• The OSB Mill16 plant will be the owner and manager of the remote 
stranding plant.  NWC will realize their returns on their wood 
equity in direct employment at the remote strander, increased 
economic activity in the region, a potentially higher net return on 
their residuals, dividends from the NWC/NRT Trucking 
Partnership and dividends from the Meadow Lake OSB plant 
partnership; 
• Expected profits per cubic meter of roundwood or the equivalent 
strands to the OSB plant is $44.44, which is based on: 28.6% return 
on investment17; $140 million investment; 900,000 cubic meters of 
roundwood delivered to the plant; 
• Payoffs are based on the change from Strategy A: no remote 
stranding and no holdup of wood fiber by NWC (nH/nRS); 
• NWC will be using the dividends paid out to shareholders from the 
Meadow Lake OSB partnership to acquire more shares in the 
                                                
16 OSB Mill is used as a generic namesake for the forestry firm.  
17 Based on conversations with Marcel L’Heureux, Manager of New Business 
Development for NWC, the payback period for the OSB plant would be 2 – 5 
years depending on the markets for OSB panels.  Using an average of 3.5 yrs for 
a payback period, the mill will generate “net cashflows” above costs of $40 
million per year or a 28.6% return on the $140 million investment.  Based on 
900,000 m3 of fiber input, the net cashflow per cubic meter is $44.44.  Because of 
the generalized nature of the estimates used to derive this number, a sensitivity 
analysis will be run with 50% and 75% lower returns and the results reported in 
chapter 6.  
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partnership from the Saskatchewan Crown Investments 
Corporation, therefore there will be no direct payments to NWC; 
• NWC has the political and/or legal means to holdup a percentage 
of the 90M cubic meters of aspen wood fiber currently allocated to 
the OSB plant based on their economic rights to the fiber, i.e. they 
are a credible threat.  For the initial run of the model it is assumed 
that NWC has the ability to holdup 25% of the 90M cubic meters of 
aspen (22,500 cubic meters) allocated to the OSB Mill plant under 
NWC’s TSL;  
• NWC is not interested in side payments or transferable utility – 
they want local employment.  
The annual payoff table is a 8 X 18 matrix, with the players’ payoffs based on 
the strategy options A through D across the horizontal, and activities associated 
with each action made by the players on the vertical access.  Activities are 
clustered under three broad developments: the present Meadow Lake OSB plant; 
the Remote Stranding plant; and NWC’s Cut-stock mill expansion.  Under each 
of these classifications, the payoffs are further subdivided into community and 
forestry firm’s change in activities based on the four strategies (nH/nRS or 
nH/RS or H/RS or H/nRS).  The payoffs are cashflow based as required for the 
calculation of NPV’s, rather than net income based. 
5.2 Strategy option A: OSB Mill does not agree to remote stranding 
and NWC does not withhold the wood fiber from the region 
This is the baseline situation, with no resulting payoffs from activities.  This 
scenario represents the current situation, with community co-operating and the 
firm pursuing an industrial paradigm of centralization to the exclusion of 
community development objectives.  90,000 cubic meters of aspen roundwood 
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are shipped from the region without any economic benefits to NWC members 
beyond the harvesting.   
NWC intends to sell waste from its operations to the Tolko - Meadow Lake 
OSB Limited Partnership (OSB Mill) to satisfy Saskatchewan Environment and 
Resource Management’s requirement for as full utilization of the harvested wood 
fiber as possible. The saleable waste stream from NWC will be from their spruce 
operations, with the aspen cut stock operation chipping their waste and 
swapping it for sawlog grade logs with Millar-Western.  US pulp mills are 
paying more for the fiber in the form of chips than the OSB plants are willing to 
pay considering the present market conditions (Al Lewis, Vice-President of 
Operations, Norboard of Toronto, Canada, 2002, personal communications).  
Because the profits and economic benefits derived by NWC are much higher 
producing aspen cut-stock than strands, it is NWC’s economic interest to acquire 
an increased supply of sawlogs for processing into cut-stock.  Therefore, NWC is 
not expected to ship their residual aspen fiber to the OSB plant, but continue to 
ship chips to Millar-Western up to the maximum exchange volume of 20,000 m3.  
NWC does not have this option for their spruce and Tolko has agreed to accept 
the debarked bundled spruce residues at $30/tonne.   
The waste form sold is dependent on the OSB requirements for efficient 
infeed handling and their ability to process the species presented.  Five classes of 
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byproduct are generated by the NWC dimension and cut stock mills and are 
handled in different ways.  These are: 
1. Sub-sawlog grade or pulp grade logs.  These logs are those that are 
brought to the yard as sawlogs, cut to length for the cut-stock or 
dimension mill, yet are found to be sub-grade either upon cutting to 
length , or at the debarker.  
2. Long mill byproduct.  This waste comes from edgings and slabs, and 
can be descrambled, bundled and shipped to Tolko or sent directly to 
onsite processing in the form of a chipper or remote stranding.  Pieces 
longer than 48” can be used for this purpose.  For this research, this 
volume was assumed to be 50% of the mill byproduct. 
3. Small mill byproduct. This product consists primarily of trim blocks 
and other mill refuse that is less than 48” in length. This waste will be 
fed into a secondary processing facility, such as a chipper or remote 
strander.  It is considered too short to bundle with any efficiency. 
4. Sawdust from the cut-stock mill. NWC will have to either dispose of 
this as waste in an on-site landfill, install a bio-mass fired strand dryer 
system, or incorporate it into a biomass heating line being developed 
for Beauval. 
5. Bark. Again, NWC will have to dispose of this product, but could 
possibly incorporate it into a biomass strand dryer line. 
NWC’s dimension mill produces 20,866 tonnes of strandable spruce waste, 
comprised of 14,916 tonnes of spruce mill byproduct and 5,950 tonnes of spruce 
pulp logs. One-half of the spruce residuals (7,458 tonnes), the long mill 
byproduct, are bundled and shipped to Meadow Lake for processing into 
strands, along with the pulpwood for a total tonnage shipped for stranding of 
13,405 tonnes.   
Compared to their waste disposal costs through local burning of $4.00 per 
tonne or $53,620 per annum, this yields NWC a loss of  $6.17/tonne and $83,000 
per year at this rate (Table 5-1), (Sprague and Gray, 2002).  This is not an 
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economically beneficial option for waste disposal, but is undertaken to satisfy the 
requirements of SERM. 
NWC income statement for the sale of spruce slabs to the ML OSB plant 
Revenues on spruce slabs and pulp wood (does not include the disposal cost savings)  $402,000
Cost of sales18 $317,000
Cost of transportation  $168,000
Net income on bundled spruce slabs and pulp wood shipped to ML OSB -$83,000
  
Total spruce residuals that are shipped to ML OSB (tonnes) 13,405
Revenue per tonne for bundled slabs $30.00
Cost of sales ($/tonne) $23.67
Cost of transportation ($/tonne) $12.50
Cost of transportation  ($/trip) $400
Average load (tonnes) 32.0
Cost of bundling ($/tonne) $11.17
Tonnes per shift (based on 500 shifts) 26.8
Salaries per shift (3 personnel @ 15.00/hr w/ benefits) $240.00
Loader expense per tonne $14.17
Net income per tonne of bundled spruce slabs shipped to ML OSB -$6.17
Table 5-1: Income from NWC sales of spruce residuals to the ML OSB plant 
Under this scenario, OSB Mill would be making an extra $294,000 net 
cashflow due to the spruce fiber shipped into the plant by NWC.  In the future, 
NWC may demand more for the fiber depending on the loss it continues to 
sustain, and whether Tolko decides to invest in the remote stranding plant. 
                                                
18 The cost of sales includes: the labour costs for performing the bundling of the 
residuals; the loader expenses for moving the bundles into inventory and loading 
the truck for shipping; and steel banding for bundling. 
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5.3 Strategy option B:  OSB Mill agrees to remote stranding at 
Beauval Forks and NWC does not withhold the wood fiber from the 
region 
Strategy B annual payoffs: nH/RS 
NWC Strategy Don't holdup wood 
OSB Mill Strategy Remote stranding 
Player NWC OSB Mill 
Net Payoff for strategy $432 $586 
Activity   
Present ML OSB plant   
NWC   
Sale of NWC spruce waste (bundled and shipped to Tolko) $83  
OSB Mill   
Profit loss because of NWC region fiber to remote strander  -$4,000 
Profits to the ML OSB from remote produced strands  $5,000 
Working capital savings on trucking of inventory at the ML OSB plant  $54 
NWC spruce waste (slabs, etc. bundled and shipped to Meadow Lake)  -$271 
Remote stranding plant   
NWC   
Sale of NWC spruce waste (remote stranded and shipped to Tolko) $0  
Savings on the disposal of the spruce residuals not shippable to ML $30  
NWC region direct employment from remote strander $305  
NWC share of profit from the remote strander plant $0  
NWC share of profit: NWC/NRT Trucking strand haul to ML OSB plant $15  
OSB Mill   
Debt repayment (principal and interest)  -$625 
Net Profit before interest and depreciation  $428 
Table 5-2: Strategy B annual payoffs ($1,000) 
This scenario represents the co-operate (NWC), co-operate (OSB Mill) strategy 
pair of the matrix.  For NWC, the activity payoffs for OSB Mill installing the 
remote strander are based on: 
• The sale of spruce waste from NWC’s dimension mill directly to 
the remote strander.  As the residues will be delivered with 
minimal handling via belt-feed systems, the remote strander can 
utilize all of the spruce residues produced instead of the only the 
larger slabs (50% of produced residues) shipped to the OSB Mill 
plant.  This yields an income on the residuals of $0.00, based on 
NWC receiving $0.00 per tonne for the residuals, but saving on the 
sawmill residue disposal expenses.  These savings include $30,000 
saved on the cost of disposing of the residuals not previously 
shipped to Meadow Lake, SK., and the $83,000 it was losing 
satisfying the SERM requirement of minimal waste disposal and 
fuller utilization of fiber within the province; 
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• A local payroll at the remote strander of $305,000 per year will be 
generated, based on 6 person-years of employment: 2 plant 
operator jobs, a grinder/knife maintenance position, a loader 
operator, a yard operator position and an operations manager; 
• NRT/NWC Trucking contract, based on profits of 4% of revenues, 
50% retained earnings, and evenly divided between the partners, 
yields NWC an annual share of the profits of $15,000 (1% of 
revenues).  
Dividend payout to NWC from trucking  of remote produced strands 
Dividends paid to NWC by NWC/NRT Trucking for strand haul to ML 
OSB (no holdup) $15,000
Profits as a percent of revenues 4.0%
Percent of dividends paid out vs. retained as earnings 50.0%
Revenues on the strand haul (no holdup) $1,482,000
NWC share of partnership 50.0%
Table 5-3: Dividend payout to NWC from trucking of remote produced strands  
The change in profits for OSB Mill from installing the remote strander is a 
function of:  
• The loss of the 90,000 M3 of NWC region roundwood shipped 
directly to the Meadow Lake OSB millyard.  Based on a $44.44 
income before taxes per tonne of roundwood input, this would be a 
$4.0 million loss; 
• The loss of $271,000 profit from the spruce waste that was shipped 
to the M.L. OSB plant; 
• The availability of additional fiber from NWC’s spruce residuals 
due to the proximity of the remote stranding plant and its ability to 
process smaller pieces, plus the availability of Canoe Lake Forest 
Products (CLFP) sawmill residues.  The remote produced strands 
would yield a profit of $5,000,000 to the OSB Mill plant because of 
the extra fiber made available.  This figure includes strands 
produced from the NWC region roundwood, NWC’s spruce waste, 
and 50% of CLFP’s waste, but does not include any losses incurred 
at the remote stranding plant.  The M.L. OSB plant is expected to 
pay $60.00 per delivered tonne of wet strands; 
• OSB Mill owning and operating the remote stranding plant; 
• Working Capital financing will be saved from the previous 
requirement for six months of roundwood inventory trucking, 
yielding a $53,654 payoff;   
• The additional capital costs for the remote stranding plant.  Based 
on informal quotes made by CAE, a major manufacturer of 
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stranding equipment, the capital costs are estimated to be $4.6 
million Cdn.   
The OSB Mill plant would like to enlist additional sources of wood fiber in 
the form of wood residues from various communities and small privately owned 
sawmills that are abundant in northern Saskatchewan.  Many of these mills could 
be made more economically viable with a market for their residues (Gary Stein, 
Director of Research, Tolko, personal communications, 2002). 
The primary source of additional fiber would be the spruce residuals from the 
NWC dimension/cut-stock mill not currently bundled and shipped to Meadow 
Lake.  Presently, the OSB Mill plant will not accept the small mill byproduct 
wood fiber, and it would be an additional source of fiber for the OSB Mill plant if 
remote stranded.  NWC is estimated to produce 8,771 tonnes of this residue, 
yielding 5,263 tonnes of strands.  Additional fiber sourced from the Canoe Lake 
First Nation’s sawmill operation (CLFP), located 35km west of Beauval Forks, 
was included in this research as example of the use of other sawmills residues.  
Because CLFP does not have a chipper facility and no contract for fiber swapping 
with Millar-Western, they would have unusable residual aspen pulp-grade logs, 
aspen residues, and spruce residues available for remote stranding. 
The total NWC spruce residues have an input volume of 14,910 tonnes and an 
output volume equivalent to 10,437 tonnes of wet strands.  An additional 
7,000m3 of pulp grade spruce logs will be culled from the sawlog merchandising, 
yielding a total wet strand tonnage of 16,387 per annum.  There is estimated to be 
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5,005 tonnes of additional spruce and 2,395 tonnes of aspen sawmill residue 
available within a less than 50km distance of Beauval Forks, along with 4,000 
tonnes of pulp-grade aspen roundwood from CLFP’s harvesting operations, 
yielding 4,158 tonnes of wet strands per annum.  This is based on only shipping 
one-half of the spruce and aspen residues due to the inefficiency of bundling the 
random short waste.   
Because of processing and the elimination of bark and fines19 (20%) from the 
roundwood at Beauval Forks instead of at Meadow Lake, 72,000 tonnes of 
roundwood-based fiber will be hauled instead of 90,000 tonnes of roundwood.  
The 90,000 cubic meters of roundwood would be 2,250 loads of roundwood 
hauled into the Meadow Lake OSB Mill millyard.  The hauling cost per trip is 
based on a trip distance of 185km from Beauval Forks20 to the Meadow Lake site.  
It was assumed that the smaller mill byproducts yield non-usable fines of 40%, 
with 60% of the input volumes becoming strands, with the balance of the input 
fiber producing 20% fines.  From a transportation perspective, with the fines 
                                                
19 Fines would be the by-product of processing that is eliminated in the screening 
due to its particle size being too small for manufacturing of the end product.  
This residual would have to be disposed of in the same fashion as the bark 
residuals. 
20 The roundwood will be hauled from various points within NWC’s region, with 
most wood going through Beauval Forks, the site of the proposed remote 
stranding plant.  If the remote stranding plant is in operation, the wood would 
then be off-loaded at the plant instead of continuing along to the Meadow Lake 
plant, therefore to compare the two options only the cost of hauling from 
Beauval Forks to the OSB plant is included. 
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from the sawmill residuals being up to 40%, it would be more economical per 
tonne to ship strands instead of bundled waste to the Meadow Lake OSB plant to 
realize this profit. 
Remote stranding is viewed as technically feasible, although the economics of 
the transportation are one of the deciding factors in implementation (Knutsen, B., 
Forentek, 2002: personal communications).  Roundwood, chips, and strands 
delivered from the NWC TSL area would be hauled on Route 162, a secondary 
highway between Beauval Forks and Green Lake, SK.  Because of its status as a 
secondary highway, there is a large differential in legal haul weights between the 
winter months of December 1st to March 15th and the June 1st to November 30th 
hauling period.  The winter season haul weight limits are 62,500 Kg, with a 
payload weight of 37,955 Kg for northern haul outfitted tractor -Super B trailer 
combination (Glen Ertell, Northern Resource Trucking, 2003, personal 
communication).  The summer season haul weight limit would be reduced to 
54,500 Kg, with a tarre weight of 29,955 Kg. 
The bulk density of the loaded strands is a critical variable in the economics 
of remote stranding due to its effect on the cost of transportation. Dry aspen 
strands have a bulk density (BD) from 95 to 190 Kg per cubic meter, with 10lbs 
per ft3 or 158 Kg per m3 used as the industrial average (Carlos Vieira, Capital 
Sales Project Manager, CAE Machinery, Burnaby, B.C., personal 
communications).  To convert the dry strand BD to wet strand BD a moisture 
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factor of 2X was assumed, yielding an industrial average BD for wet strands of 
317 Kg per m3.   
Based on a trailer capacity of 117 cubic meters, NRT could haul between 
22,246 Kg and 46,347 Kg, with an average of 37,077 Kg, with the seasonally 
averaged maximum payload for Route 162 of 32,902 Kg or 32.902 tonnes.  At a 
bulk density of 281 Kgs/m3 and higher, the loads are limited by weight instead 
of volume.  For a BD of 20.0lbs/ft3 or 317kgs/m3, strand shipping costs are $16.46 
per tonne or 88.38% of the expense of shipping the equivalent roundwood 
(Tables 5-4 & 5-5).   
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Cost per delivered wet strand tonne comparison between roundwood and remote processed 
strands.  
(based on industrial average for bulk density of strands)  
Roundwood volume hauled from the region (M cubic meters) 90.000 
Roundwood tonnes hauled from the region 90,000 
roundwood haul cost per net tonne of wet strands $18.63 
Wet strand tonnes hauled from the region from roundwood 72,000 
Transportation cost per net tonne of wet strands $16.46 
$ difference in haul cost between wet strands and the equivalent roundwood -$2.17 
Percentage difference in haul cost between wet strands and the equivalent roundwood 88% 
Roundwood hauling assumptions  
Tonnes of roundwood hauled per trip(wted. avg. for winter/summer seasons) 36.355 
Winter load limit (assume legal load wts, not oversize permitted loads) (net tarre (kgs)) 37,955 
Summer load limit - net tarre (kgs) 29,955 
Percent of roundwood hauled in winter 80% 
Trips per annum from the region 2476 
Trips per tractor unit during the winter haul 4.0 
Trailer purchase price (Super-B log haul) $120,000 
Trailer maintenance per annum $8,000 
Years of use 7 
Trailer costs per annum $18,286 
Number of the trailers on the haul 5 
Trailer costs per trip $37 
Transportation charge by NWC/NRT Trucking per trip (8 axle-truck only) $505 
Roundwood haul cost per trip (Beauval-ML OSB) $542 
Roundwood haul cost per tonne $14.90 
Table 5-4: Transportation Costs of Remotely Processed Wet Strands w/ BD of 317 
kgs/m3: Roundwood hauling.  
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Wet Strand hauling assumptions  
Maximum tonnes of strands hauled per trip by weight(wted. avg. for winter/summer seasons) 32.902 
Maximum tonnes of strands hauled per trip by volume(wted. avg. for winter/summer seasons) 37.077 
Maximum load limit based on: weight 
Winter load limit (assume legal load wts, not oversize permitted loads) (net tarre (kgs)) 37,955 
Summer load limit - net tarre (kgs) 29,955 
Percent of strands hauled in winter 37% 
Trips per annum from the region 2188 
Annual mileage per tractor unit (km) 240712 
Trailer purchase price (Super-B side tip) $180,000 
Trailer maintenance per annum $8,000 
Years of use 7 
Trailer costs per annum $26,857 
Number of the trailers on the haul 3 
Trailer costs per trip $37 
Hauling charge by NWC/NRT Trucking per trip (8 axle-truck only) $505 
Strand haul cost per trip (Beauval-ML OSB) $542 
Bulk density of wet strands: industrial average (kgs per cubic meter) 317 
Side-tip Super-B trailer capacity (m3) 117 
Table 5-5: Transportation Costs of Remotely Processed Strands w/ BD of 317 
kgs/m3: Wet strand hauling. 
The remote stranding operation will yield a $428,000 net profit before interest 
and depreciation and a net income of -$107,000 in years 1-5 and -$32,000 in years 
6-10 (Table 5-6).  An estimated 90,000 tonnes of wet strands would be produced 
and shipped to Meadow Lake.  Appendix Table A-5 details the inputs to the 
Remote Strander Proforma Income Statement. 
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Proforma Income Statement: remote stranding plant 
Based on industry average of 20lbs/ft3 for the bulk density of wet strands 
  
Revenues $5,400 
Revenues on aspen roundwood  $4,320 
Revenues on NWC spruce residuals  $626 
Revenues on NWC aspen residuals  $0 
Revenues on other local sawmills spruce residuals  $105 
Revenues on other local sawmill aspen residuals  $349 
  
Cost of Sales $4,884 
Personnel $245 
Cost of NWC spruce residuals $0 
Cost of NWC aspen residuals $0 
Cost of NWC hardwood roundwood $2,652 
Cost of CLFP spruce residuals $50 
Cost of CLFP aspen residuals $15 
Cost of CLFP hardwood roundwood $222 
Maintenance $10 
Consumables $54 
Clamps/carriers/anvils, etc. $50 
Power $89 
Misc. $15 
  
Loading and transportation $1,482 
Gross Profit $515 
Management and administration expenses $87 
Net profit before interest and depreciation $428 
Equipment financing interest $76 
Depreciation $460 
Net Income -$107 
Net income per tonne of input ($/tonne) -$1.02 
% of revenues -1.98% 
Table 5-6: Proforma Income Statement: Remote stranding plant. ($1,000) 
Roundwood hauling from the forestry blocks of the NWC region will be 80% 
by tonnage in the winter months and the fiber will be inventoried for six months 
on average.  Based on the roundwood trucking cost per tonne of $14.90 (Table 5-
4), the working capital financing costs for the trucking of 90,000 cubic meters of 
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roundwood from the NWC TSL would be $54,00021.  Remote stranding would 
have similar inventory levels, but not have invested in the log haul to Meadow 
Lake and would deliver strands just-in-time.  
The capital costs for the installation of the remote stranding plant include: all 
infeed systems including the conditioning ponds, debarking and chopping 
equipment; the actual stranding line; outfeed, short-term storage, and overhead 
loading systems.  OSB Mill will invest 40% of the cost ($1.84 million) and the 
balance will be commercially financed over five years at the prime lending rate 
of 5%.  No risk premium on the financing was assumed due to OSB Mill’s 
financial strength.  The annual debt repayment would be $625,00022. 
                                                
21 Based on a finance rate of 8% on the trucking expenses ($14.90 per tonne X 
90,000 m3 -> $1,341,000 X 4% ->$53,640) of hauling 90,000m3 of NWC TSL wood, 
for six months.  (1 m3 of aspen roundwood equals 1 tonne). 
22 Based on a 60 months payment period with constant monthly payments of 
$52,085 and a constant interest rate of 5%. 
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5.4 Strategy option C:  OSB Mill agrees to remote stranding and 
NWC withholds wood fiber from the region 
Strategy C annual payoffs: H/RS 
NWC Strategy Holdup wood 
OSB Mill  Strategy Remote stranding 
 NWC OSB Mill 
Heldup wood volumes (%) 25%  
Net Payoff for strategy $889 -$542 
Activity   
Present ML OSB plant   
NWC   
Sale of NWC spruce waste (slabs, etc. bundled and shipped to OSB) $83  
OSB Mill   
Profit loss because of NWC region roundwood fiber to remote strander  -$3,000 
Profit loss because of NWC region roundwood fiber holdup  -$1,000 
Profits to the ML OSB from remote produced strands  $4,000 
Working capital savings on trucking of inventory at the ML OSB plant  $40 
NWC spruce waste (slabs, etc. bundled and shipped to Meadow Lake)  -$271 
Remote stranding plant   
NWC   
Sale of NWC spruce waste (remote stranded and shipped to OSB) $0  
Savings on the disposal of the spruce residuals not shippable to ML $30   
NWC region direct employment from remote strander $305  
NWC share of profit from the remote strander plant $0  
NWC share of profit: NWC/NRT Trucking strand haul to ML OSB plant $12  
OSB Mill   
Debt repayment (principal and interest)  -$625 
Net Profit before interest and depreciation  $313 
NWC Cut-stock mill expansion   
NWC   
Debt repayment (principal and interest) -$89  
Net Profit before interest and depreciation $187  
Equipment replacement/refurbishing as an annualized expense -$32  
Chipping the waste to MW $167  
Additional payroll @ NWC mill  due to held-up wood $226  
Table 5-7: Strategy C annual payoffs ($1,000) 
This scenario represents the non-co-operative (NWC), co-operate (OSB Mill) 
strategy pair of the matrix.  The holdup of wood supply from the NWC TSL 
would be a legal and/or political process.  There is the possibility of a temporary 
loss of all roundwood from the region due to direct action, but the model for this 
research only takes into account the permanent holdup volumes equal to what is 
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deemed as the region’s equity in the wood fiber.  Direct action would be seen as 
a means to legitimize NWC’s right to a percentage of the wood fiber with the 
Government by participants. 
Under co-operation, with its binding agreements and trust of the other 
party’s actions, this scenario would not happen.  It is only under an antagonistic 
relationship, where NWC uses the holdup of wood supply as a threat, that this 
could materialize.  The OSB Mill plant may still pursue the strategy of installing 
the remote strander, because to not do it would even more costly.  Even under 
fiber holdup or diversion by NWC, if there is large amounts of additional wood 
fiber they could access due to the installation of the remote stranding plant, the 
OSB plant would profit.  The action of holding up wood supply would be 
considered irrational on the part of NWC under a general game if they gained 
the establishment of the remote stranding plant, yet may be rational for NWC in 
this specific game if they gain more from diverting the wood fiber to their own 
mill.   
For NWC and OSB Mill, the activity payoffs for OSB Mill installing the 
remote strander would be the same as Strategy B, with the exceptions of: 
• NWC would holdup 25% of the 90,000 cubic meters of aspen 
(22,500 cubic meters) allocated to Tolko under NWC’s TSL.  Of this 
22,500 cubic meters, 65% would grade as sawlogs (14,625 cubic 
meters), with the balance of 7,875 cubic meters being shipped to 
Millar-Western as pulp logs; 
• Under the holdup of wood supply, NWC will build additional 
capacity into its present aspen cut-stock mill or build a separate 
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cut-stock plant to handle the extra wood fiber available for 
processing. The cost of this expansion would be $42.34 per cubic 
meter of capacity (Sprague and Gray, 2002).  At a 25% holdup, the 
extra capacity would cost NWC $619,000.  The efficiency of the mill 
is assumed to be constant across different holdup volumes, with 
the equipment and manpower choices made to optimize the system 
for the established volume of wood.  They have the available 
capital and debt financing, along with management personnel to be 
able to build and operate the plant under the additional volumes.  
An annualized expense of $31,00023 is allocated for equipment 
replacement and/or refurbishing; 
• There would be a positive cashflow of $189,000, directly made by 
NWC on the 25% withheld wood fiber. A net cashflow of $13.84 per 
additional cubic meter of sawlogs processed by the mill is assumed 
(Sprague and Gray, 2002); 
• The strand haul by NWC/NRT Trucking would be diminished by 
the volume of wood withheld and thus the dividends realized by 
NWC would diminish to $12,000 from $15,000; 
• All aspen residues would be chipped and sent to the Millar-
Western pulpmill.  As these volumes will be above the 
sawlog/chips swap volume of 20Mm3, MW will pay NWC $30.00 
per tonne for the chips (Appendix Table A-6: NWC Chipper 
Cashflows); 
• An additional payroll for NWC at its sawmill due to the extra 
volumes processed of $226,000.  This is considered a positive 
number for NWC because its community members are benefiting.  
The cost of the payroll is accounted for in the $13.84 per cubic 
meter of held-up wood that NWC gains in cashflow; 
• OSB Mill will realize $1 million lower profits ($4.0 million) on the 
reduced remotely produced strand volume;  
• The Working Capital savings on the cost of transportation will be 
lower due to less roundwood having been available to haul. 
                                                
23 This annual equipment expenses is based on a replacement expense of 50% of 
the original capital expenses over 10 years. 
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5.5 Strategy option D: OSB Mill does not agree to remote stranding 
and NWC withholds wood fiber from the region 
Strategy D annual payoffs: H/nRS 
NWC Strategy Holdup wood 
OSB Mill Strategy No remote stranding 
 NWC OSB Mill 
Heldup wood volumes (%) 25%  
Net Payoff for strategy $439 -$1,000 
Activity   
Present ML OSB plant   
NWC   
Sale of NWC spruce waste (slabs, etc. bundled and shipped to OSB) -$83  
Disposal cost of spruce waste that could be shipped to OSB   
OSB Mill   
Profit loss because of NWC region roundwood fiber to remote strander  NA 
Profit loss because of NWC region roundwood fiber holdup  -$1,000 
Profits to the ML OSB from remote produced strands  NA 
Working capital savings on trucking of inventory at the ML OSB plant  NA 
NWC spruce waste (slabs, etc. bundled and shipped to Meadow Lake)  $0 
NWC Cut-stock mill expansion   
NWC   
Debt repayment (principal and interest) -$89  
Net Profit before interest and depreciation $187  
Equipment replacement/refurbishing as an annualized expense -$31  
Chipping the waste to MW $167  
Additional payroll @ NWC mill due to held-up wood $226  
Table 5-8: Strategy D annual payoffs ($1,000) 
This would be the most aggressive non-co-operative stance on the part of 
each player, and represents the non-co-operate (NWC), non-co-operate (OSB 
Mill) payoff box of the matrix.  For NWC, the activity payoffs for OSB Mill not 
installing the remote strander are based on Strategies A and C.  NWC sawmill 
residues are handled as in Strategy A, with NWC losing $83,000 on the spruce 
slabs shipped to Meadow Lake and gaining no payoffs from residues that would 
be remote stranded under Strategy B & C.  The withheld aspen fiber would be 
processed as in Strategy C, with NWC building and operating additional 
processing capacity.   
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The OSB Mill plant’s change in activity payoffs from Strategy A are affected 
by the loss in wood fiber due to the NWC holdup, and hence the effect on the net 
cashflows of the Meadow Lake OSB plant.  The OSB Mill plant will continue to 
accept the bundled spruce waste from the NWC dimension mill even though 
NWC has withheld a percentage of the roundwood and diverted it to their cut-
stock mill.  It is in the OSB Mill plant’s financial interest to continue to access this 
increased fiber source.  Retaliation is not a viable threat to NWC changing its 
withholding tactics, because NWC would gain financially by not having a 
market for their spruce waste. 
5.6 NPV derivation of ten-year payoffs from Strategy options A-D 
The annual cashflow-based payoffs for each player’s action under Strategies 
A – D are summarized and imported into a 10 year NPV table (Table 5-9 and 5-
10).  Capital expenses in the remote strander and/or NWC’s sawmill expansion 
are input at year 0 and have a zero salvage value at the end of ten years.  These 
capital expenses are financed for 5 years in both OSB Mill and NWC’s case.  
Years 6 – 10 reflect the debt repayment savings of $625,000 and $89,000, 
respectively, where the players have made initial capital investments. 
Equipment upgrades and refurbishing of the remote strander are made in 
year 5, and are based on 50% of the initial capital expenses ($1,390,000).  This is 
reflected in OSB Mill payoffs for year 5 of: Strategy B: -$804,000 and Strategy C: -
$1,932,000.  OSB Mill’s years 6 – 10 reflect that these expenses are internally 
financed and do not decrease the annual payoffs with debt repayment.
 Pa
ge
 6
5 
N
PV
 p
ay
of
f t
ab
le
 (Y
ea
r 1
-1
0)
  
 
St
ra
te
gy
 A
: 
St
ra
te
gy
 B
: 
NW
C 
St
ra
te
gy
 
Do
n'
t h
ol
du
p 
w
oo
d 
Do
n'
t h
ol
du
p 
w
oo
d 
O
SB
 M
ill
 S
tr
at
eg
y 
No
 R
em
ot
e 
st
ra
nd
in
g 
Re
m
ot
e 
st
ra
nd
in
g 
 
NW
C 
O
SB
 M
ill
 
NW
C 
O
SB
 M
ill
 
He
ld
up
 w
oo
d 
vo
lu
m
es
 (%
) 
NA
 
 
NA
 
 
Ne
t P
re
se
nt
 V
al
ue
 o
f P
ay
of
fs
 
$0
  
$0
  
$2
,9
01
  
$2
,8
45
  
Ne
t J
oi
nt
 p
ay
of
f 
$0
  
 
$5
,7
46
  
 
An
nu
al
 N
et
 P
ay
of
fs
 
 
 
 
 
Ye
ar
 0
 (e
qu
ity
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 p
la
nt
s)
 
 
 
 
-$
1,
84
0 
Ye
ar
 1
 
$0
 
$0
 
$4
32
 
$5
86
 
Ye
ar
 2
 
$0
 
$0
 
$4
32
 
$5
86
 
Ye
ar
 3
 
$0
 
$0
 
$4
32
 
$5
86
 
Ye
ar
 4
 
$0
 
$0
 
$4
32
 
$5
86
 
Ye
ar
 5
 
$0
 
$0
 
$4
32
 
-$
80
3 
Ye
ar
 6
 
$0
 
$0
 
$4
32
 
$1
,2
11
 
Ye
ar
 7
 
$0
 
$0
 
$4
32
 
$1
,2
11
 
Ye
ar
 8
 
$0
 
$0
 
$4
32
 
$1
,2
11
 
Ye
ar
 9
 
$0
 
$0
 
$4
32
 
$1
,2
11
 
Ye
ar
 1
0 
$0
 
$0
 
$4
32
 
$1
,2
11
 
Ta
bl
e 
5-
9:
 N
PV
 p
ay
of
fs
 (Y
ea
r 1
-1
0)
 S
tr
at
eg
y 
A
 a
nd
 B
 ($
1,
00
0)
 
 
 Pa
ge
 6
6 
N
PV
 p
ay
of
f t
ab
le
 (Y
ea
r 1
-1
0)
  
 
St
ra
te
gy
 C
: 
St
ra
te
gy
 D
: 
NW
C 
St
ra
te
gy
 
W
ith
ho
ld
 w
oo
d 
W
ith
ho
ld
 w
oo
d 
O
SB
 M
ill
  S
tr
at
eg
y 
Re
m
ot
e 
st
ra
nd
in
g 
No
 re
m
ot
e 
st
ra
nd
in
g 
 
NW
C 
O
SB
 M
ill
 
NW
C 
O
SB
 M
ill
 
W
ith
he
ld
 w
oo
d 
vo
lu
m
es
 (%
) 
25
.0
%
 
 
25
.0
%
 
 
Ne
t P
re
se
nt
 V
al
ue
 o
f P
ay
of
fs
 
$6
,2
05
  
($
4,
72
8)
 
$3
,3
23
  
($
6,
71
0)
 
Ne
t J
oi
nt
 p
ay
of
f 
$1
,4
77
  
 
($
3,
38
7)
 
 
An
nu
al
 N
et
 P
ay
of
fs
 
 
 
 
 
Ye
ar
 0
 (e
qu
ity
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 p
la
nt
s)
 
$0
 
-$
1,
84
0 
$0
 
 
Ye
ar
 1
 
$8
88
 
-$
54
2 
$4
59
 
-$
1,
00
0 
Ye
ar
 2
 
$8
88
 
-$
54
2 
$4
59
 
-$
1,
00
0 
Ye
ar
 3
 
$8
88
 
-$
54
2 
$4
59
 
-$
1,
00
0 
Ye
ar
 4
 
$8
88
 
-$
54
2 
$4
59
 
-$
1,
00
0 
Ye
ar
 5
 
$8
88
 
-$
1,
93
2 
$4
59
 
-$
1,
00
0 
Ye
ar
 6
 
$9
77
 
$8
2 
$5
48
 
-$
1,
00
0 
Ye
ar
 7
 
$9
77
 
$8
2 
$5
48
 
-$
1,
00
0 
Ye
ar
 8
 
$9
77
 
$8
2 
$5
48
 
-$
1,
00
0 
Ye
ar
 9
 
$9
77
 
$8
2 
$5
48
 
-$
1,
00
0 
Ye
ar
 1
0 
$9
77
 
$8
2 
$5
48
 
-$
1,
00
0 
Ta
bl
e 
5-
10
: N
PV
 p
ay
of
fs
 (Y
ea
r 1
-1
0)
 S
tr
at
eg
y 
C
 a
nd
 D
 ($
1,
00
0)
 Page 67 
The net joint payoffs are calculated by summing the two players NPV payoffs 
under each case.  The co-operate/co-operate (nH/RS) strategy pair of Strategy B 
has the highest net joint payoff of $5.7 million, and the non-co-operate/non-co-
operate (H/nRS) strategy pair of Strategy D has the lowest net joint payoff of -
$3.4 million.  
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Chapter 6 
Results 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 will examine the results and the basis for these results under the 
four different scenarios presented in Chapter 5.  The base results are reported for 
what is considered a likely scenario: NWC’s holdup of 25% of the regional aspen 
allocation to the OSB Mill plant, the payment of $0.00/tonne to NWC for its 
residues into the remote strander, and OSB Mill’s profit of $44.44 per cubic meter 
of roundwood input.  The dominance of the base model’s outcome is then tested 
with a sensitivity analysis.  Changes in NWC’s withhold level, the price that 
NWC is paid for its spruce residuals, the profit that the OSB Mill plant would 
achieve per cubic meter of roundwood or equivalent fiber input, and the bulk 
density of the wet strands shipped from the remote strander plant to Meadow 
Lake and its effect on the OSB Mill plant’s transportation expenses are tested. 
The rules of the game used in this research are: 
• This is a one-off game, without iterations; 
• The options of the players are limited to the four cases, i.e. OSB 
Mill’s actions cannot be influenced by outside investment options24;   
                                                
24 This rule will be relaxed, allowing the OSB Mill plant to choose to make $4.6 
million in outside investments rather than into the remote strander plant, 
effectively eliminating Strategy C from the decision set.  In Chapter 7, the 
resulting response from NWC and under what scenarios NWC would be 
induced to co-operate will be examined. 
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• There is full transparency of the payoffs of each player to both 
players, i.e. common knowledge of the payoffs, but no joint 
decisions on the strategies;  
• The players are economically rational, i.e. they choose a strategy 
that maximizes their expected payoff. 
6.2 Baseline Results 
The initial model run was performed with the baseline assumptions of:  
• NWC can achieve a 25% holdup on the aspen allocation to the OSB 
plant under NWC’s TSL; 
• NWC is being paid $0.00 for the spruce residues delivered to the 
remote strander; 
• The Meadow Lake OSB plant achieves a profit of $44.44 per cubic 
meter of aspen round wood or equivalent input; 
• The wet strand bulk density is 20lbs per ft3 or 317 Kgs per M3 for 
transportation purposes;  
• NWC’s net cashflow on the withheld fiber is $13.84 per cubic meter. 
(For a complete list of assumptions, refer to Appendix I) 
Tables 6-1 and 62 report the results. Strategy A results are equal to zero, with 
Strategies B-D expressed as the difference from Strategy A. Strategy B (nH/RS) 
offers OSB Mill the only gains, and also offers the highest Net Joint Players 
payoff ($5.7 million).  NWC gains the highest payoff under Strategy C ($6.6 
million). 
NPV payoffs (Years 1-10) 
 Strategy A: Strategy B: 
NWC Strategy Don't holdup wood Don't holdup wood 
OSB Mill Strategy No Remote stranding Remote stranding 
 NWC OSB Mill NWC OSB Mill 
Net Present Value of Payoffs $0  $0  $2,902  $2,846  
Net Joint Players payoff $0   $5,747   
Table 6-1: NPV payoffs ($1,000) (Years 1-10) Strategy A and B Summary 
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NPV payoffs (Years 1-10) 
 Strategy C: Strategy D: 
NWC Strategy Holdup wood Holdup wood 
OSB Mill Strategy Remote stranding No remote stranding 
 NWC OSB Mill NWC OSB Mill 
Heldup wood volumes (%) 25.0%  25.0%  
Net Present Value of Payoffs $6,205 ($4,728) $3,323 ($6,710) 
Net Joint Players payoff $1,477  ($3,387)  
Table 6-2: NPV payoffs ($1,000) (Years 1-10) Strategy C and D Summary  
Expressed in the 2x2 matrix of the PD game, as delineated in Chapter 3, it 
shows the interaction of the players’ strategies.  Players  assess their own payoffs 
relative to the other player’s possible actions.  In the case of a 2x2 matrix, the 
player has to analyze his play under each of the other player’s two choices of 
action.  The logic of play is based on economic rationality, maximizing the gain 
or minimizing the loss under the strict rules of the game.  In most game plays a 
dominant strategy will arise for each player, yielding a dominant outcome or 
Nash equilibrium for the game. 
For the baseline game, the players’ logic is: NWC reasons that the other 
player OSB Mill can build the remote strander (RS) or not build the remote 
strander (nRS).  If OSB Mill builds the strander, NWC would holdup up wood 
supply (H) for a 10 years payoff of $6.62 million.  If OSB Mill doesn’t build the 
remote strander, NWC will still holdup for a payoff of $3.19 million, therefore 
NWC will holdup.  To holdup is NWC’s dominant strategy. 
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  OSB Mill  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  Remote 
Strander 
No Remote 
Strander 
NWC Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
Strategy B:  
(2.90, 2.85) 
 
Strategy A:  
(0.00, 0.00) 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
Strategy C: 
(6.20, -4.73) 
Strategy D:  
(3.32, -6.71) 
Table 6-3: (Baseline game; ($ millions)) 
OSB Mill reasons that NWC can holdup 25% of the wood fiber (H) or not 
holdup fiber (nH).  If NWC doesn’t hold up fiber, OSB Mill would install the 
remote strander, yielding a payoff of $2.85 million and if NWC holds up, OSB 
Mill would lose less by investing in the remote strander (-$4.73 vs. -$6.71 
million).  The dominant joint strategy of the game is to Hold/build the Remote 
Strander (H/RS). 
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
How dominant is the outcome Hold/Remote Strand (H/RS) from the 
baseline model run?  What variables can be changed that would result in NWC 
co-operating with OSB Mill, yielding a nH/RS outcome?  To test this, a 
sensitivity analysis was run with: 
• NWC achieving a 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% holdup on the 
aspen allocation to the OSB Mill plant under NWC’s TSL; 
• NWC being paid -$4.00 (the alternative cost of disposal), $0.00, and 
$15.94 (the breakeven price paid to CLFP, adjusted for the cost of 
transportation) for the spruce residues delivered to the remote 
strander; 
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• The OSB Mill plant achieves a profit of $44.44, 50% of $44.44 or 
$22.22, and $11.11 per cubic meter of aspen round wood or 
equivalent input;  
• The wet strand bulk densities of 20lbs per ft3 or 317 Kg per M3 or 
12lbs per ft3 or 190 Kg per m3; and 
• NWC achieving a net cashflow of $13.84, $6.92, $3.46, and $0.00 per 
additional cubic meter of sawlogs processed by the NWC aspen 
cut-stock mill.  
6.3.1 Change in NWC aspen fiber withholding 
OSB needs to assess what percentage of equity the community would be able 
to access control over through political and/or legal means.  Based on the wood 
fiber equity of the communities and the need for steady flows of wood fiber into 
the OSB plant, OSB can assess whether it should build and operate the remote 
stranding facility or not, to secure long-term profitability for the OSB plant.  For 
this research, the holdup and NWC using 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% of the 
90M cubic meters of the NWC regional wood were run. 
Of the five holdup levels tested, 0% and 100% are the only levels that produce 
a strategy that differs from the baseline 25% withholding (Table 6-4). 
 Dominant Strategy 
% fiber withheld NWC OSB Mill Joint 
0% fiber nH RS nH/RS
25% fiber (Table 6-3) H RS H/RS 
50% fiber (Table A-7) H RS H/RS 
75% fiber (Table A-8) H RS H/RS 
100% fiber (Table 6-6) H Na H/nRS
Table 6-4: (Strategies for NWC aspen fiber withholding) 
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Under 0% NWC holdup, the NPV values are: 
  OSB Mill  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  Remote 
Strander 
No Remote 
Strander 
NWC Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
Strategy B:  
(2.90, 2.85) 
 
Strategy A:  
(0.00, 0.00) 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
Strategy C: 
(2.90, 2.85) 
Strategy D:  
(0.00, 0.00) 
Table 6-5: (0% NWC aspen fiber withholding; payoffs; ($ millions)) 
This yields nH/RS as the dominant strategy pair. 
 
Under 100% NWC holdup, the NPV values are: 
  OSB Mill  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  Remote 
Strander 
No Remote 
Strander 
NWC Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
Strategy B:  
(2.90, 2.85) 
 
Strategy A:  
(0.00, 0.00) 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
Strategy C: 
(15.98, -27.45) 
Strategy D:  
(13.16, -26.84) 
Table 6-6: (100% NWC aspen fiber withholding; ($ millions)) 
At 100% NWC holdup, OSB Mill does not have a dominant strategy, but 
relies on NWC’s dominate strategy of Holding up (H) to develop its own 
strategy.  The game plays: NWC holds up under both nRS and RS, therefore H 
dominants.  OSB Mill would RS with no holdup, and nRS with NWC holdup, but 
they reason that NWC will always H, therefore OSB MILL nRS.  The dominant 
play becomes H/nRS, being individually and jointly sub-optimal. 
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Saddle points lead to indeterminate outcomes. These saddle points are 
indifference points for each of the players in taking action, NWC to hold or not to 
hold, or OSB MILL to remote strand or to not remote strand.  NWC’s saddle 
point to OSB Mill’s action of building or not building the remote stranding is at 
0.1% fiber holdup.  Such a low percentage holdup positive payoff for NWC 
would not bode well for OSB MILL assuming a non-adversarial stance from 
NWC as they will always move for holdup unless there is explicit co-operation25.  
If outside investments are not a possibility for OSB Mill, they become indifferent 
to building the remote strander under holdup at 83% holdup. 
6.3.2 Change in the amount NWC is paid for spruce residues 
NWC sells 50% of its spruce residues directly to the Meadow Lake OSB plant 
and disposes of the remaining 50% at -$4.00 per tonne.  For this research, three 
residual price points were used; -$4.00, $0.00, and $15.31 per tonne of input fiber 
to the remote strander facility. The -$4.00 is based on the current local disposal 
cost for NWC.  CLFP will be paid the break-even price of $15.31, plus 
transportation expenses, per tonne for their bundled residuals.  The NWC board 
may demand that they be paid at least as much as CLFP is paid for their fiber, 
and hence the $15.31 was tested for its outcome on the game. 
                                                
25 Co-operation is defined as a joint decision that is fully binding on both parties. 
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 Dominant Strategy 
$ paid NWC for spruce residuals per tonne NWC OSB Mill Joint 
-$ 4.00 (Table A-9) NH RS nH/RS 
 $ 0.00 (Table 6-3) H RS H/RS 
 $15.31 (Table A-10) H RS H/RS 
Table 6-7: (Strategies for NWC spruce residual payment) 
If Strategy C is eliminated from the possibility set, at what point would NWC 
be indifferent to holding up under nRS and RS?  At ($1.30) per tonne NWC 
payment for disposal of its spruce residuals, the NPV values are: 
  OSB Mill  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  Remote 
Strander 
No Remote 
Strander 
NWC Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
Strategy B:  
(2.77, 2.55) 
 
Strategy A:  
(0.00, 0.00) 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
Strategy C: 
(6.07, -4.60) 
Strategy D:  
(2.77, -6.71) 
Table 6-8: (-$4.00 NWC payment for its spruce residuals; ($ millions)) 
Holding up under nRS would yield NWC the same payoff as not holding up 
under RS.  If NWC then co-operated with OSB Mill in the building of the Remote 
Strander, OSB Mill would gain $9.26 million under Strategy B over Strategy D. 
6.3.3 Change in the profit that the OSB plant achieves on input fiber 
For this research, $44.44, $22.22, and $11.11 profit per cubic meter of 
roundwood input into the OSB plant was tested.  Table 6-9 summarizes the 
outcomes. 
 Page 76 
 Dominant Strategy 
$ Profit: OSB Mill plant per input tonne NWC OSB Mill Joint 
$ 44.00 (Table 6-3) H RS H/RS 
$ 22.22 (Table 6-8) H nRS H/nRS 
 $11.11 (Table 6-11) H nRS H/nRS 
Table 6-9: (Strategies for OSB Mill profit per input tonne) 
Under $22.22 profit per cubic meter of roundwood or equivalent input, the 
NPV values are: 
  OSB Mill  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  Remote 
Strander 
No Remote 
Strander 
NWC Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
Strategy B:  
(2.90, 0.40) 
 
Strategy A:  
(0.00, 0.00) 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
Strategy C: 
(6.20, -3.82) 
Strategy D:  
(3.32, -3.36) 
Table 6-10: ($22.22 OSB Mill profit per input tonne ($ millions)) 
NWC holds up under both nRS and RS, therefore H dominates.  OSB Mill will 
Remote Strand (RS ) with no holdup, and will not Remote Strand (nRS) with 
NWC holdup, but they reason that NWC will always H, therefore OSB Mill nRS.  
The dominant play becomes H/nRS, being individually and jointly sub-optimal. 
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Under $11.11 profit per cubic meter of roundwood or equivalent input, the 
NPV values are: 
  OSB Mill  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  Remote 
Strander 
No Remote 
Strander 
NWC Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
Strategy B:  
(2.90, -0.82) 
 
Strategy A:  
(0, 0) 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
Strategy C: 
(6.20, -3.36) 
Strategy D:  
(3.32, -1.68) 
Table 6-11: ($11.11 OSB Mill profit per input tonne ($ millions)) 
NWC holds up under both nRS and RS, therefore H dominates.  OSB Mill will 
not Remote Strand (nRS) under both nH and H, therefore nRS dominates, giving 
a play of H/nRS. 
The saddle point is at $26.44 profit per m3 of roundwood input to the OSB 
Mill plant or 59.5% of the baseline $44.44 where OSB Mill becomes indifferent 
under holdup by NWC, and won’t build the remote strander. 
  OSB Mill  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  Remote 
Strander 
No Remote 
Strander 
NWC Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
Strategy B:  
(2.90, 0.86) 
 
Strategy A:  
(0, 0) 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
Strategy C: 
(6.20, -3.99) 
Strategy D:  
(3.32, -3.99) 
Table 6-12: ($26.44 OSB Mill profit per input tonne ($ millions)) 
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Under this scenario, OSB Mill reasons that NWC can H or nH.  Under nH, 
they would RS, but NWC would H under RS, therefore, since there is no gain for 
OSB under H/RS, OSB will nRS.  Strategy D becomes the dominant strategy 
(H/nRS), which is sub-optimal individually and jointly for NWC and OSB. 
6.3.4 Change in the Bulk Density of Wet Strands 
Two analyses were performed to assess the difference in shipping the wet 
strands between Beauval Forks and the Meadow Lake OSB plant, based on the 
dry bulk densities of 6.0 or 10.0 lbs per ft3.  A moisture factor of 2X was assumed, 
to yield wet strand BDs of 12.0, and 20.0 lbs per ft3 or 190 and 317 Kgs per m3.  
For a BD of 190, strand shipping costs were $24.19 per tonne or 130% of the 
expense of shipping the equivalent roundwood (Tables 6-11 and 6-12). 
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Cost per delivered wet strand tonne comparison between roundwood and remote processed 
strands. 
(based on low density for bulk density of strands)  
roundwood volume hauled from the region (M cubic meters) 90.000 
roundwood tonnes hauled from the region 90,000 
roundwood haul cost per net tonne of wet strands $18.63 
wet strand tonnes hauled from the region 72,000 
haul cost per net tonne of wet strands $24.19 
$ difference in haul cost between wet strands and the equivalent roundwood $5.56 
percentage difference in haul cost between wet strands and the equivalent roundwood 129.83% 
  
Roundwood hauling  
tonnes of roundwood hauled per trip(wted. avg. for winter/summer seasons) 36.355 
winter load limit (assume legal load wts, not oversize permitted loads) (net tarre (kgs)) 37,955 
summer load limit - net tarre (kgs) 29,955 
percent of roundwood hauled in winter 80% 
trips per annum from the region 2476 
trailer purchase price (Super-B log haul) $120,000 
trailer maintenance per annum $8,000 
years of use 7 
trailer costs per annum $18,286 
number of the trailers on the haul 5 
trailer costs per trip $37 
hauling charge by NWC/NRT Trucking per trip (8 axle-truck only) $505 
roundwood haul cost per trip (Beauval-ML OSB) $542 
roundwood haul cost per tonne $14.90 
roundwood haul cost per net tonne of wet strands $18.63 
Table 6-13: Transportation Costs of Remotely Processed Wet Strands w/ BD of 
190 kgs/m3  
 
 Page 80 
Wet Strand hauling  
maximum tonnes of strands hauled per trip by weight(wted. avg. for winter/summer seasons) 32.902 
maximum tonnes of strands hauled per trip by volume(wted. avg. for winter/summer seasons) 22.246 
winter load limit (assume legal load wts, not oversize permitted loads) (net tarre (kgs)) 37,955 
summer load limit - net tarre (kgs) 29,955 
percent of strands hauled in winter 37% 
trips per annum from the region 3236 
trailer purchase price (Super-B side tip) $180,000 
trailer maintenance per annum $8,000 
years of use 7 
trailer costs per annum $26,857 
number of the trailers on the haul 4 
trailer costs per trip $33 
hauling charge by NWC/NRT Trucking per trip (8 axle-truck only) $505 
strand haul cost per trip (Beauval-ML OSB) $538 
strand haul cost per tonne $24.19 
  
Assumptions:  
distance from Beauval Forks to ML OSB plant (km) 165 
hauling charge by NWC/NRT Trucking per Km (8 axle-truck only) $1.53 
aspen weight per m3 (tonne) 1.00 
no back haul to offset the expenses  
no salvage value on the trailer  
roundwood weight loss to residuals 20.0% 
bulk density of wet strands: low bulk density (kgs per cubic meter) 190 
Side-tip Super-B trailer capacity (m3) 117 
Table 6-14: Transportation Costs of Remotely Processed Wet Strands w/ BD of 
190 kgs/m3 continued. 
For a BD of 20.0lbs/ft3 or 317kgs/m3, strand shipping costs were $16.46 per 
tonne or 88.38% of the expense of shipping the equivalent roundwood (Table 6-
12).  At a bulk density of 281 kgs/m3 and higher, the loads are limited by weight 
instead of volume.  This would be the point of most efficient use of the trailers 
volume capacity, while minimizing strand degrade due to fiber crushing and 
breakage. 
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The two strand shipping costs, the baseline of $16.46 and $24.19 per tonne 
were input into the PD model.  The baseline expense of $16.46 per tonne wet 
strand shipping costs yielded a joint strategy of H/RS.  The $24.19 shipping cost 
yielded the NPV values of: 
  OSB Mill  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  Remote 
Strander 
No Remote 
Strander 
NWC Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
Strategy B:  
(2.95, -1.82) 
 
Strategy A:  
(0.00, 0.00) 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
Strategy C: 
(6.24, -8.46) 
Strategy D:  
(3.32, -6.71) 
Table 6-15: ($24.19/tonne Wet Strand shipping expense; $ millions)) 
NWC will Holdup (H) in both strategies, therefore H is dominant.  For OSB 
Mill, nRS is dominant.  H/nRS becomes the dominant strategy.  There is minimal 
impact on NWC from the increase in shipping costs, but OSB Mill sees a 142% 
increase in its losses ($-4.73 -> $-6.71(millions)).  
Under nH on the part of NWC, OSB Mill is indifferent to nRS vs. RS at a Bulk 
Density of 217 Kg/M3, with a shipping cost of $21.18 per tonne.  With NWC 
holding up as its dominant play, the BD would have to be greater than 223 Kg 
per M3, with a shipping cost of $20.61 per tonne of wet strands or less, for OSB 
Mill to pursue the RS strategy (Table 6-16). 
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  OSB  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  Remote 
Strander 
No Remote 
Strander 
NWC Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
Strategy B:  
(2.93, 0.34) 
 
Strategy A:  
(0.00, 0.00) 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
Strategy C: 
(6.22, -6.73) 
Strategy D:  
(3.32, -6.71) 
Table 6-16: ($21.18/tonne Wet Strand shipping expense ($ millions)) 
6.3.5 Change in NWC Cashflow Levels from the Withheld Wood fiber 
NWC witholding wood supply from the region dominates, therefore the 
research tested the effect on NWC’s decision process by reducing the cashflows 
gained from the withheld wood.  The original run set the NWC cashflow per 
cubic meter of roundwood withheld at $13.84.  50% ($6.92) and 25% ($3.46), and 
$0.00 levels were run to test for the dominance of H/RS.  Table 6-15 summarizes 
the results. 
 Dominant Strategy
NWC cashflow per M3 of withheld roundwood NWC OSB MILL Joint 
 $13.84 cashflow per M3 (Table 6-3) H RS H/RS 
 $ 6.92 cashflow per M3 (Table A-11) H RS H/RS 
 $ 3.46 cashflow per M3 (Table 6-3) H RS H/RS 
 $ 0.00 cashflow per M3 (Table 6-3) H RS H/RS 
-$22.60 cashflow per M3 (Table 6-18) na RS Saddle
Table 6-17: (Strategy outcomes for NWC Cashflows per M3 roundwood 
withheld) 
The H/RS joint strategy dominates until NWC’s cashflows per m3 of 
roundwood fall below ($22.60). 
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  OSB MILL  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  Remote 
Strander 
No Remote 
Strander 
NWC Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
Strategy B:  
(2.90, 2.85) 
 
Strategy A:  
(0.00, 0.00) 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
Strategy C: 
(2.90, -4.73) 
Strategy D:  
(0.02, -6.71) 
Table 6-18: (-$22.60 NWC Cashflows per M3 roundwood withheld ($ millions)) 
The indifference point for NWC holding up or not holding up fiber would be 
a ($22.60). 
6.4 Summary of the Results 
For the standard game, with only two choices of action per player, H/RS is 
the overall dominant strategy, with rare exception.  NWC will not move to 
withhold wood supply under the conditions of: 
• No legal ability to perform a long-term holdup.  They may be able 
to affect short-term holdup through direct action, but that was not 
modeled; or 
• NWC would need to lose $22.60 or more per cubic meter of aspen 
roundwood that they withhold and process in their own mill. 
OSB MILL will not invest and operate the remote strander under the 
conditions of: 
• NWC controlling and diverting to their regional sawmill greater 
than 83% of the wood from the region; 
• OSB MILL makes less than $26.44 net cashflow per cubic meter of 
roundwood or the equivalent fiber from strands; 
• The cost of transport of the remote processed strands is greater 
than $20.61 per tonne, which is based on a bulk density of less than 
223 Kg/M3.  
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Chapter 7 examines the implications of these results and the relaxed strategy 
where OSB MILL would invest outside, eliminating Strategy C from the game 
set.  Conditions under which OSB MILL and NWC should co-operate will be 
delineated.
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
The rate of global forest industrialization is unprecedented in history.  With 
this comes the potential for conflict between stakeholders.  In many areas of the 
world, the use of power by the forestry major to enact full access to the regional 
resource against the community will has been extreme.  To balance this, 
community based stakeholders take a stance against their exploitation, moving 
to withhold local resources from the firm. The alternative to this radical outcome 
is to co-operate.  The consciousness and moral codes shift to ones where 
interdependency, sharing and the development of trust become the main guide 
points (Craig, 1989).  With this shift, comes a paradigm shift in how the business 
organization is expected to operate, what its goals are, and what it gives back to 
society.   
The forestry major can continue to feed the dependent, reactive model of 
community or become part of the solution.  The forestry firm is in a position as 
leader and potential collaborator to bring the resources forward to facilitate the 
paradigm shift to a symbiotic mode of operating for both parties.  They gain 
through their adoption of a more symbiotic attitude by being able to operate in a 
less turbulent environment, allowing them to concentrate on the technical issues 
of wood product manufacturing and marketing.  Wood supply, environmental 
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use of the forest, and local community economic development are less 
politicized. 
This research examined under what economic circumstances would the 
forestry firm, the Meadow Lake OSB Partnership Ltd., and the regional 
development authority, as expressed by NWC, co-operate or not co-operate in 
the processing of wood fiber from the region.  A Prisoner’s Dilemma 2x2 game 
was the lens for analysis. 
7.2 Summary of Conclusions 
The original hypothesis was: 
By Meadow Lake OSB Partnership Ltd. vertically de-integrating, i.e. outsourcing 
its processing services, there will be a long-term improvement in their Meadow 
Lake OSB plant’s profitability due to a secure and increased feedstock for the 
plant, as measured by NPV over a 10 year planning horizon; 
This research has shown that the major forestry firm’s long-term profitability 
will improve or diminish less with a remote stranding plant, due to stabilized 
wood-supply to the OSB MILL plant instead of the community seeking 
alternative allocations for wood fiber from the region.  The question for Tolko is 
how to move or under what circumstances would the community group enter a 
co-operative relationship instead of the dominant adversarial holdup scenario?   
Why would the players consider acting in a co-operative way to the other 
player of the game?  In the majority of the model runs, the Meadow Lake OSB 
Partnership Ltd building and operating the remote strander was the dominant 
play.  It is in the firm’s long-term economic self-interest to build and operate the 
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remote strander, either to minimize losses incurred because of fiber loss due to 
NWC holdup, or to make a profit.  Under all non-holdup plays, Tolko would 
build the Remote strander, except where: 
•
 Tolko’s profits on input fiber are below $18.60 per tonne of 
roundwood or equivalent; 
•
 The bulk density of the wet strands is less than 217 Kgs per M3; 
Under the strict game, NWC would not holdup where:  
• NWC loses $22.60 or more per cubic meter of aspen roundwood 
that they holdup and process in their own mill. 
If OSB Mill where to move outside the strict rules of the game and openly 
communicate their refusal to Strategy C (H/RS) because they have investment 
options for the $4.6 million that will yield a greater return than the losses 
sustained from NWC’s holdup under RS, NWC would be induced to co-operate 
if one of these scenarios is true: 
• NWC has the ability to holdup 21.8% or less of the fiber; 
• NWC receives greater than -$1.90 per tonne for the spruce waste 
delivered to the remote strander, i.e. they pay less than $1.90 per 
tonne for residual disposal; or 
• NWC expects to make less than $9.20 per cubic meter of wood 
input into their mill. 
Based on this research, the forestry resource firm needs to examine the ability 
of the community to process the regional fiber as an alternative to the firm 
processing it.  If they have the capabilities to follow through on alternative 
processing, the forestry firm should view the community as having a high 
salience to their long-term profitability. 
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The community development corporation can empower itself through the 
acquisition of the technical expertise and financial backing to process some of the 
wood fiber from the region.  This would increase their bargaining credibility as a 
viable threat to the firm, and thus induce co-operation in the community 
economic development. 
There are no technical engineering reasons for lack of implementation of 
remote stranding facilities in North America other than the idea of duplication. 
Remote or satellite stranding implementation, or lack there of, relates to the 
economics of centralization and ownership/control of the resource.    
When one examines only the cost of transportation of the roundwood versus 
shipping the equivalent strands, the results yield minimal if any cost savings 
compared to the capital investment, making remote strand look economically 
infeasible.  If one includes the potential for additional fiber being available to the 
OSB MILL operator, and the ability to politically ensure a consistent fiber supply 
into a high fixed cost business, the $4.6 million investment is deemed 
worthwhile. 
The ecological and environmental engineering ramifications of the decision to 
build a remote stranding facility include:  
• fuller utilization of the wood fiber from the region because there is 
a higher use of the residuals from the communities’ (NWC and 
CLFP mills) sawmills; 
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• less wood fiber weight hauled over the northern highways per ft2 
of OSB panel production – yielding less impact on the northern 
road system; 
• lower disposal volumes of fines at the Meadow Lake site – cited as 
a potential storage problem in the Environmental Assessment 
review (Stantec, 2001); 
• availability of a ready supply of biomass fuel for the community of 
Beauval, SK to reduce their use of imported propane for domestic 
and municipal heating requirements. 
For the large forestry firm to decentralize some of its production facilities and 
move from the status quo of centralization, they have to believe that the 
community group could affect the supply of wood into their operation, and that 
the modeling technique and outcomes reflect their operating reality.  Many of the 
forestry firms have moved to limit any availability of wood fiber to community-
based sawmill operations to limit the development of a creditable threat that 
would have the political sway, financial backing, and technical skills to succeed.  
Effectively, the firms have acted to limit the environment where this game could 
develop.  How long can the firm control this environment? 
Internationally, there have been many sweeping reforms of the forestry 
allocation practices as democratic pressures force the governments to respond to 
its citizens needs and the degradation of the forest ecosystem with forestry sector 
readjustments.  In Indonesia, under the Suharto regime, the national government 
held complete administrative authority to the forestry resources.  Under this 
control, over 20 million m3 of unprocessed timber was exported per year, 
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yielding minimal local community benefits, with most of the export earnings 
going to institutional power holders within the state apparatus (Barr, 2001). 
With the political reforms of the post-Suharto period providing for the 
decentralization and devolution of administrative authority in the forestry sector 
from the national government to the provincial and district governments.  With 
these reforms came the need for many of the multi-national and previously 
monopolistic forestry processing and export firms to adjust their organization’s 
operating paradigm in regards to the forestry communities’ welfare to ensure 
wood supply.  Timber shortages at the firm lead the Bob Hasan Group to create 
an 180,000 ha Acacia plantation, and import wood from Malaysia and Australia. 
This example points to the fact that resource firms may be able to control their 
resource allocations for a period of time, but outside dynamics can 
fundamentally change their rights to the resource.  In British Columbia, the 
Provincial Government has the responsibility and legal right to manage forestry 
fiber allocations.  Their alliances have been with the large provincial and multi-
national forestry processors in the province.  Increasingly, communities have 
moved to have the province allocate them some form of local rights to manage 
the forest resource as the local community deems would benefit it.  As individual 
communities, they have received little in the decentralization of allocation of 
wood fiber (Gill and Reed, 1999).  These once individual forestry communities 
have now joined into a forestry community group of 40 communities to petition 
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the provincial government for increased devolution of resource allocation and 
management to the local (Copeland, 1999). 
With the adoption of the model of decentralization of components of the fiber 
process earlier in the process, the major forestry firms of BC could minimize 
disruptions to their wood supply and hence profits.  Without earlier adoption, 
the firm is more likely to be in conflict with the communities, risking alienation 
and diminishment of its fiber inflows.  Community collaborative forestry 
agreements could provide operating environment stability for the firm in the 
context of changing property rights to the forest fiber.  For the exercise examined 
in this research, it takes very little reallocation of fiber, i.e. a small recognition by 
the Province of community rights to the fiber, for the profit picture of the firm to 
change by several million dollars.   
7.3 Limitations of the Study and Recommendations for Further 
Research 
The Player’s rationality is limited to economic maximization.  The community 
actions are dictated by the drive for community economic development, not the 
more encompassing community well-being.  A game could be designed that 
used players’ utilities as payoffs, but to measure a community and/or a region’s 
non-economic utility from the installation of a remote processing plant, with any 
degree of confidence, may prove to be impossible.   
This game was expressed as a closed environment, with only two players and 
non-iterative, one-off with limited actions/reactions.  The player’s actions were 
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final, limiting the interplay.  With a multiple iteration game, where the dynamics 
of co-operation/non-co-operation can play out over a time horizon, players 
would build a sense of trust or non-trust of the other player, modifying his 
actions accordingly.  In a multi-iterative game, co-operation along a convergence 
path may yield a more jointly profitable solution than choosing the joint solution 
immediately (Camerer, 1997). 
There is no modeling for decision-making under uncertainty.  This research 
did not use risk-adjusted payoffs.  If risk or uncertainty was introduced into the 
model, the player’s may be induced to co-operate more readily, depending on 
their risk preferences.  One would have to assign probabilities to the payoffs and 
to the various levels of wood fiber that NWC would be able to withhold from the 
OSB MILL plant.  Because (H/RS) was so dominant within the sensitivity 
analysis, this work may not yield anymore valid a model than what was already 
derived in this research. 
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Appendix 
General assumptions 
present aspen volumes harvested from NWC TSL for Tolko (M cubic meters) 90.000
% community equity in aspen 25.0%
aspen withheld and diverted to NWC mill (M cubic meters) 22.500
prime financing rate 5.00%
discount rate used for NPV calculations 8.00%
conversion volumes of m3 aspen->strands 3
ft3 per m3 34.86
weight of m3 of spruce (kgs) 820
percent of a tonne: spruce 82.00%
weight of m3 of aspen (kgs) 1000
weight of m3 of aspen (lbs) 2200
percent of a tonne: aspen 100.00%
bulk density of dry aspen strands (lbs. per ft3) 12.5
bulk density of dry aspen strands (lbs. per M3) 436
bulk density of dry aspen strands (Kgs. per M3) 198
multiplication factor for moisture 2.0
bulk density of wet aspen strands used for model Hi (Kgs. per M3) 396
bulk density of wet aspen strands used for model industry average @10lbs/ft3 dry(Kgs. per 
M3) 317
bulk density of wet aspen strands used for model Low (kgs. per M3) 190
Table A-1: General model assumptions for payoff calculations 
NWC assumptions 
NWC sawmill(s)  
projected capital expenses $1,738,097
projected net profit when operating at 100% of expected output $568,130
Cut-stock mill sawlogs requirement (cubic meters) 41,047
Non-sawgrade timber harvested 22,102
Total timber harvested 63,149
projected net cashflows per M cubic meters of sawlog input $13,841
projected Operations labour costs per annum $486,080
projected Operations labour costs per M cubic meters of sawlog input $11,842
projected management/administration costs per annum  $200,000
projected management/administration costs per M cubic meters of sawlog input $4,872
projected total payroll per M cubic meters of sawlog input $16,714
equipment and loader annual depreciation $189,513
equipment and loader annual depreciation per M cubic meter $4,617
percent of depreciation required for equipment refurbishing/replacement 50.0%
equipment and loader annual refurbishing/replacement per M cubic meter $2,308
Table A-2: NWC assumptions for payoff calculations
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NWC present operations  
delivered millyard cost of aspen logs ($ per cubic meter) $29.47
total aspen log volume into primary breakdown (Mm3) 40.500
total spruce log volume into primary breakdown (Mm3) 90.000
chip/strandable aspen sawmill waste produced (%) 45.9%
chip/strandable aspen sawmill waste produced (Mm3)  
chip/strandable aspen sawmill waste produced (tonne) 30,607
strandable spruce sawmill waste produced (%) 19.5%
strandable spruce sawmill waste produced (Mm3)  
strandable spruce sawmill waste produced (tonne) 14,910
total aspen residuals chipped and shipped to Millar-Western (tonnes) 30,607
total aspen residuals stranded and/or shipped to ML OSB 0
spruce pulp wood produced (tonnes) 5,950
total spruce residuals that could be shipped to ML OSB (tonnes) 13,405
  
NWC additional operations with community equity wood  
harvested wood to sawlog grade wood (%) 65%
percent of harvested logs shipped as pulpwood to Mistik 35%
community equity sawlogs (M cubic meters) 14.625
community equity non-sawlogs (M cubic meters) 7.875
Cut-stock mill residual waste (% of cut-stock log input) 20.0%
maximum volume of chips that can be swapped with Millar-Western for graded tree-length 
(Ktonnes) 20.000
  
additional capital expenses to support the additional volume ($ per cubic meter sawlogs) $42.34
additional capital expenses to support the additional volume (total $) $619,284
NWC equity (%) 40%
NWC equity ($) $247,714
Debt financing (%) 60%
Debt financing ($) $371,571
cost of financing risk premium (%) 2.50%
cost of financing (% per annum) 7.50%
debt financing term (months) 60
debt financing expense ($ per month) ($7,446)
cost of financing ($ per annum (interest only))  
Table A-2: NWC assumptions for payoff calculations (cont.) 
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Meadow Lake OSB 
revenues on spruce slabs and pulp wood (without the disposal cost savings)  $402,152
cost of sales $317,355
cost of transportation  $167,563
net income on bundled spruce slabs and pulpwood shipped to ML OSB -$82,766
  
total spruce residuals that could be shipped to ML OSB (tonnes) 13,405
revenue per tonne for bundled slabs $30.00
residue disposal cost savings ($ per tonne) $4.00
cost of sales ($/tonne) $23.67
cost of transportation ($/tonne) $12.50
cost of the haul $400.00
average load (tonnes) 32.0
cost of bundling ($/tonne) $11.17
tonnes per shift (based on 500 shifts) 26.8
salaries per shift (2 personnel @ 15.00/hr w/ benefits) $240.00
loader (@$65/hr x 1/4hr) $59.58
net income per tonne of bundled spruce slabs shipped to ML OSB -$6.17
  
Remote Stranding plant  
sale of spruce slabs  
spruce slabs sold to remote stranding plant (tonnes) 13,405
spruce residuals besides the slabs sold to remote stranding plant (tonnes) 1,505
value of NWC spruce residuals into remote strander ($/tonne) $0.00
total aspen residuals stranded and/or shipped to ML OSB 0
  
projected payroll for remote stranding plant ($ total per annum) $305,000
Grinder Technician $60,000
General Operations (2x) $90,000
Loader Operator $50,000
Yard Operations (1x) $45,000
Operations Manager $60,000
  
dividends paid to NWC by NWC/NRT Trucking for strand haul to ML OSB (no holdup) $14,818
dividends paid to NWC by NWC/NRT Trucking for strand haul to ML OSB (w/ holdup) $11,854
profits as a percent of revenues 4.0%
percent of dividends paid out vs. retained as earnings 50.0%
Revenues on the strand haul (no holdup) $1,481,774
Revenues on the strand haul (w/ holdup) $1,185,414
NWC share of partnership 50.0%
Table A-2: NWC assumptions for payoff calculations (cont.) 
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TOLKO assumptions  
Meadow Lake OSB  
delivered millyard cost of aspen logs ($ per cubic meter) $30.00
delivered millyard cost of aspen logs ($ per cubic tonne) $30.00
distance from Beauval Forks to ML OSB plant (km) 165
roundwood weight loss to residuals 20.0%
wood shipped from NWC TSL with NWC holdup (M cubic meters per annum) 67.500
change in wood shipped from NWC TSL with NWC holdup (M cubic meters per yr.) -22.500
income per m3 of input of roundwood ($ per tonne) $44.44
payback period (yrs) 3.5
capital investment $140,000,000
payback per year $40,000,000
total fiber into plant (M m3) 900
income per m3 of input of strands ($ per tonne) $55.56
profits to the ML OSB from remote produced strands $4,999,911
working capital savings on trucking of inventory at the ML OSB plant $53,654
Remote Stranding plant  
initial equipment only costs $2,780,000
initial capital costs (estimated from CAE Ainsworth study) $4,600,000
Tolko equity (%) 40%
Tolko equity ($) $1,840,000 
Debt financing (%) 60%
Debt financing ($) $2,760,000 
cost of financing risk premium (%) 0.00%
cost of financing (%) 5.00%
debt financing term (months) 60
debt financing expense ($ per month (interest only)) $6,299 
debt financing expense ($ per month) ($52,085)
depreciation per annum (based on 10yr straight line) 10.0%
long slab residual wood fines 20.00%
nonlong slab residual wood fines 40.00%
roundwood weight loss to non-usable fines 20.00%
slab to other strandable residuals 50.00%
maximum throughput based on CAE 37/118 - 24 knife flaker per annum (tonnes) 145,455
Mlbs per hr capacity of dry 40
moisture factor 200%
shifts per annum 500
hrs per shift 8
total weight of strands delivered to ML OSB plant 89,998
additional weight of fiber delivered to the ML OSB plant 12,034
total weight of aspen roundwood strands (tonnes) 77,200
total weight of spruce residual strands (tonnes) 12,189
total weight of aspen residual strands (tonne) 609
Table A-3: Tolko assumptions for payoff calculations 
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Proforma Income Statement: remote stranding plant 
based on industry average of 20lbs/ft3 for the bulk density of wet strands 
No withholding of wood supply by NWC  
Revenues $5,399,904 
revenues on aspen roundwood  $4,320,000 
revenues on NWC spruce residuals  $626,226 
revenues on NWC aspen residuals  $0 
revenues on other local sawmills spruce residuals  $105,112 
revenues on other local sawmill aspen residuals  $348,565 
  
Cost of Sales $4,884,494 
personnel $245,000 
cost of NWC spruce residuals $0 
cost of NWC aspen residuals $0 
cost of NWC hardwood roundwood $2,652,300 
cost of CLFP spruce residuals $50,054 
cost of CLFP aspen residuals $15,235 
cost of CLFP hardwood roundwood $222,025 
maintenance $10,000 
consumables $53,760 
clamps/carriers/anvils, etc. $50,000 
power $89,347 
misc. $15,000 
  
loading and transportation $1,481,774 
Gross Profit $515,410 
management and administration expenses $87,000 
Net profit before interest and depreciation $428,410 
equipment financing interest $75,587 
depreciation $460,000 
Net Income -$107,177 
net income per tonne of input ($/tonne) -$1.02 
% of revenues -1.98% 
Table A-3: Proforma Income Statement: remote stranding plant 
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Assumptions: Remote Strander Income Statement 
input pricing on NWC spruce residuals ($/tonne) $0.00 
input pricing on NWC aspen residuals ($/tonne) $0.00 
input pricing on NWC TSL hardwood roundwood ($/m3) $29.47 
input pricing on CLFP spruce residuals ($/tonne) $20.00 
input pricing on CLFP aspen residuals ($/tonne) $20.00 
input pricing on CLFP roundwood ($/m3) $34.16 
total weight of strands delivered to ML OSB plant 89,998 
additional weight of fiber delivered to the ML OSB plant 12,034 
total weight of aspen roundwood strands (tonnes) 77,200 
total weight of spruce residual strands (tonnes) 12,189 
total weight of aspen residual strands (tonne) 609 
payload per trip (seasonally averaged) tonnes 32.902 
trips per year 2,735 
input volumes of NWC aspen roundwood (Mm3) 90.0 
input weight of NWC aspen roundwood (tonnes) 90,000 
output weight of NWC aspen roundwood strands (tonnes) 72,000 
input of NWC spruce residuals (tonne) 14,910 
output weight of strands made from NWC spruce residuals 10,437 
equivalent output weight of spruce strands already shipped to ML OSB  
input of NWC aspen residuals (tonnes) 0 
output weight of strands made from NWC aspen residuals 0 
input volumes of CLFP aspen roundwood (Mm3) 6.5 
input weight of CLFP aspen roundwood (tonnes) 6,500 
output weight of CLFP aspen roundwood strands (tonnes) 5,200 
input of CLFP spruce residuals (tonne) 2,503 
output weight of strands made from CLFP spruce residuals 1,752 
input of CLFP aspen residuals (tonnes) 762 
output weight of strands made from CLFP aspen residuals 609 
tonne:m3 of spruce residuals 1.00 
tonne:m3 of aspen residuals 1 
tonne:m3 of aspen roundwood 1 
long slab residual wood fines 20.0% 
non-long slab residual wood fines 40.0% 
roundwood weight loss to non-usable fines 20.0% 
delivered wet strand price to ML OSB ($/tonne) $60.00 
cost of transportation to ML OSB ($/tonne) $16.46 
net wet strand price fob Beauval Forks ($/tonne) $43.54 
administration expenses as % of revenues 0.50% 
depreciation per annum (based on 10yr straight line) 10.00% 
discount rate 8.00% 
financing rate 5.00% 
financing period (mths) 60 
debt financing expense ($ per month (interest only)) $6,299 
Meadow Lake NWC region wood inventory (months) 6 
roundwood delivered cost per tonne to ML OSB plant $30.00 
roundwood trucking cost per tonne to ML OSB plant $14.90 
Table A-4: Assumptions for remote strander income statement 
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NWC income statement for the sale of spruce slabs to the ML OSB plant 
revenues on spruce slabs and pulp wood (includes the disposal cost savings)  $402,152
cost of sales $317,355
cost of transportation  $167,563
net income on bundled spruce slabs and pulp wood shipped to ML OSB -$82,766
  
Assumptions:  
total spruce residuals that are shipped to ML OSB (tonnes) 13,405
revenue per tonne for bundled slabs $30.00
cost of sales ($/tonne) $23.67
cost of transportation ($/tonne) $12.50
cost of the haul $400
average load (tonnes) 32.0
cost of bundling ($/tonne) $11.17
tonnes per shift (based on 500 shifts) 26.8
salaries per shift (3 personnel @ 15.00/hr w/ benefits) $240.00
loader (@$65/hr x 1/4hr) $59.58
net income per tonne of bundled spruce slabs shipped to ML OSB -$6.17
Table A-5: NWC income statement for spruce slabs 
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  OSB MILL  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  Remote 
Strander 
No Remote 
Strander 
NWC Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
Strategy B:  
(2.90, 2.85) 
 
Strategy A:  
(0.00, 0.00) 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
Strategy C: 
(9.46, -12.30) 
Strategy D:  
(6.60, -13.42) 
Table A-7: (50% NWC aspen fiber withholding; ($ millions)) 
  OSB MILL  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  Remote 
Strander 
No Remote 
Strander 
NWC Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
Strategy B:  
(2.90, 2.85) 
 
Strategy A:  
(0.00, 0.00) 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
Strategy C: 
(12.72, -19.87) 
Strategy D:  
(9.88, -20.13) 
Table A-8: (75% NWC aspen fiber withholding; ($ millions)) 
  OSB MILL  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  Remote 
Strander 
No Remote 
Strander 
NWC Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
Strategy B:  
(2.50, 3.25) 
 
Strategy A:  
(0.00, 0.00) 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
Strategy C: 
(5.80, -4.33) 
Strategy D:  
(2.77, -6.71) 
Table A-9: (-$4.00 NWC payment for its spruce residuals; ($ millions)) 
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  OSB MILL  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  Remote 
Strander 
No Remote 
Strander 
NWC Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
Strategy B:  
(4.43, 1.31) 
 
Strategy A:  
(0.00, 0.00) 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
Strategy C: 
(7.74, -6.26) 
Strategy D:  
(2.77, -6.71) 
Table A-10: ($15.31 NWC payment for its spruce residuals; ($ millions)) 
  OSB MILL  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  Remote 
Strander 
No Remote 
Strander 
NWC Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
Strategy B:  
(2.90, 2.85) 
 
Strategy A:  
(0.00, 0.00) 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
Strategy C: 
(5.58, -4.73) 
Strategy D:  
(2.70, -6.71) 
Table A-11: ($6.92 NWC Cashflows per M3 roundwood withheld ($ millions)) 
  OSB MILL  
 Strategies Paradigm CF Paradigm IF 
  Remote 
Strander 
No Remote 
Strander 
NWC Don’t Holdup 
wood fiber to 
Firm plant 
Strategy B:  
(2.90, 2.85) 
 
Strategy A:  
(0.00, 0.00) 
 Holdup wood 
fiber to Firm 
plant 
Strategy C: 
(5.26, -4.73) 
Strategy D:  
(2.38, -6.71) 
Table A-12: ($3.46 NWC Cashflows per M3 roundwood withheld ($ millions)) 
 
